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This paper explores the rate of return to education in South Africa with special focus on the 
pattern of returns to different levels of schooling. Although a basic assumption of neoclassical 
human capital theory is that returns to education diminish, past analysis for South Africa suggests 
that returns are more likely to be convex. Estimates, however, are based on widely differing data 
and estimation methods so that only tentative conclusions can be drawn. In this paper we 
undertake a rigorous econometric exercise in which the same parametric and semi-parametric 
techniques are applied to a number of nationally representative datasets so that the results can be 
effectively compared. We find that in South Africa private returns to education increase, as 
appears to be the case for many other African countries. The implications of such a core 
assumption of neoclassical human capital theory being violated are particularly relevant when 
analysing poverty and inequality. The neoclassical conclusion of convergence of the income 
distribution over time does not hold. Rather, the emergence of poverty traps and persistence of 
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Human capital theory is based on the notion that people expend time and money in acquiring 
education in order to increase their productivity and consequently the expected value of lifetime 
earnings (Becker (1964); Hansen (1963); Mincer (1958), (1974 ); Ben-Porath (1967)). The 
distribution of investment in such human assets provides the basis for the distribution of income 
and wealth in an economy. Education is therefore seen as a key determinant of welfare with 
predictions of neoclassical human capital theories providing the basis for much development 
policy around the world. 
In the last 20 years a key aspect of this international development strategy has been the focus on 
the importance of primary as opposed to tertiary education. This approach has been based on 
often dated, highly aggregated empirical findings of diminishing marginal returns to education. 
South Africa too has foil owed this development trajectory with government allocating significant 
proportions of the national budget to expenditure on schooling, particularly primary. It is 
therefore especially important to have knowledge of the monetary returns individuals receive 
when attaining different levels of education. The main task of this study is to establish the pattern 
of returns to education in South Africa and to consider the implications this has for the 
persistence of inequality. 
There is evidence to suggest that returns to education in South Africa, as well as in many other 
African countries, may be convex as opposed to concave. Estimates however are based on widely 
differing techniques and data sources so that only tenuous conclusions can be drawn. We 
undertake a rigorous econometric exercise in which the same estimation methods are applied to a 
number of nationally representative South African datasets in order to establish a robust result. 
Only once this is achieved are we in a position to apply the appropriate economic theory when 
analyzing education and its impact on the earnings distribution, the implications for the 
persistence of inequality and the relevant policy issues that should be considered. 
In this study we assume that human capital is the key determinant of income and that schooling 
equates to human capital. Schooling refers to primary, secondary and tertiary education. The 
paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explores the notions of intergenerational mobility and 
poverty traps and explores the consequences of non-linearities in the returns to investments in 
human capital. In Section 3 the concept of a private rate of return to education is defined and the 










discussed. Section 4 reviews evidence of the worldwide pattern of returns to education and 
considers in detail recent studies of South Africa. In Section 5 we present our own empirical 
analysis in which we apply the same cross-sectional econometric techniques to 4 different 
datasets in an attempt to determine whether consistent patterns emerge. We also employ semi-
parametric techniques to uncover any patterns that parametric approaches may conceal. Finally, 
we conclude. 
2. Human Capital and Inequality: 
linearity 
the consequence of non-
Neoclassical economlC theory assumes that markets function perfectly and human capital 
investments are subject to diminishing marginal returns. Based on these conditions, wage rates 
and capital-labour ratios converge within and between countries to a single, steady-state 
equilibrium that is stable over time. Initial endowments of income and assets do not matter for 
long run levels of consumption and output (Romer (1986». In a country such as South Africa, 
with one of the highest levels of inequality in the world, the theory then predicts that in the long 
run, less-equipped economic agents (or countries) can accumulate the necessary human capital so 
that differences are eliminated. But what if markets do not function perfectly or the returns to 
investment in human capital do not decrease at the margin? Indeed, it is becoming increasingly 
common for empirical work to reveal that returns should not be assumed to be concave, whether 
these be returns to physical capital, social capital or to education. What are the consequences for 
poverty and inequality if this fundamental assumption of neoclassical theory docs not hold? In 
order to gain insight into these types of issues it becomes necessary to have an understanding of 
the broader theory of intergenerational mobility and poverty traps. 
Poverty traps occur when identical agents become 'caught' in a position of high-level or low-
level economic status, due to self-enforcing initial conditions that matter not only in the short run, 
but in the long run as well. In such scenarios, inequality can be shown to persist for long periods. 
There is a range of models in which the interaction of human capital and income provide 
sufficient conditions to produce such multiple competitive equilibrium outcomes that are stable 
over time. In these models, poverty traps are shown to result from mechanisms such as credit 
market imperfections, externalities associated with "membership groups" and through increasing 











One of the most commonly modelled causes of a poverty trap is the existence of credit market 
imperfections. Loury (1981) and Barham, Broadway, Marchand and Pestieu (1994) construct 
overlapping generations models in which returns to education decrease but a liquidity constraint 
exists. It is not possible to borrow for training purposes from the capital market and therefore 
education must be financed from family income. In Loury's model, parents are altruistic and in 
each period family income is divided between consumption and training of offspring. The 
parents' utility is a function of current consumption and the future well-being of their offspring, 
which is in part a function of the amount of training the child receives. An individual's income is 
also dependent on randomly distributed innate ability. In the model of Barham ef ai, parents are 
not altruistic, but a child can borrow from his/her parents, provided he repays the loan in the 
second period. While he is being educated the loan is used to finance consumption and the cost 
of training. In both these models, the extent of investment in the child's education is determined 
by the initial wealth of the parent. 
In Loury's model, if parents investing less in children who experience higher marginal returns to 
education could borrow from parents investing more in children who receive lower marginal 
returns, then income in the next period could on average be higher for both families. In 
imperfectly working credit markets, this convergence does not take place. In Barham et af where 
income is divided between consumption and training, and a child must repay money borrowed to 
finance training, there may be a level in which family income is so low, that it is rational for an 
individual not to acquire an education at all. He will choose rather to work and earn in period 
one. 
The key point to note is that in both of these two models the existence of multiple equilibria is 
possible. Intergenerational mobility is low and those with initially low earnings may be trapped 
with low human capital and in poverty. 
Another set of models of persistent inequality consider the division of society into particular 
social groups as an important determinant of poverty traps. Lundberg and Startz (1996) explore 
the role of human capital accumulation in generating persistent inequality among white and black 
Americans. They develop an overlapping generations model in which positive externalities 
associated \'\·ith a stock of social capital impact on future individual human capital investments 
which in turn impact on the stock of social capital accumulated. In times of racial discrimination. 











of the races. If the expected return is lower for African Americans than for equally educated 
white Americans the optimal strategy for Africans would be to invest in a lower level 
equilibrium. Lundberg and Startz (1996) show that if social capital is a function of the average 
human capital of a group, and if social capital exhibits increasing returns, then inequality can 
persist over time. This need not be due to present discrimination, but rather might be due to past 
discrimination that altered the pattern of human capital accumulation in an earlier period. Clearly 
this is a relevant finding for South Africa. 
Along similar lines Durlauf (2002) explores how segregated and different groups impact on 
members in different ways. His example of "role model effects" explores a situation in which the 
probability of going to college depends on the percentage attendance of one's "group". He shows 
how multiple steady states of college attendance may arise in the absence of current 
discrimination but rather as a result of group attitudes and perceptions. 
We finally consider a third set of models which are the main interest of our paper. In these 
models that once again implicitly place human capital as the key determinant of economic 
outcomes. it is the actual pattern of returns to investment in human capital that impact on the 
persistence of inequality. In a world in which the returns to human capital increase, as opposed 
to decrease, the implications for the possibility of poverty trap outcomes can be severe. 
Romer's (1986) seminal work on increasing returns and growth shows the possibility of long run 
divergence in the distribution of income between countries in the presence of increasing returns to 
human capital investment. His research was motivated by the evident persistence of inequality 
between countries at different stages of development. Romer develops a competitive equilibrium 
endogenous e,'To\\1h model in which knowledge is the basic form of capital, the accumulation of 
which by forward-looking, profit maximizing agents drives long run growth. The model 
comprises three key elements relating to the production and accumulation of "new knowledge", 
and its impact on output growth. The first assumption regards "new knowledge". "New 
knowledge" results from research that is subject to diminishing marginal returns in the 
accumulation of further knowledge. When at the frontier of research and development, it is 
especially difficult for a firm to acquire more knowledge. "New knowledge", however, gives rise 
to positive externalities in that ifone firm acquires new knowledge, the production possibilities of 
other firms expand as they can copy or learn from the innovating firm. Production of 











increasing returns in the production of output. Even if all other factors of production are held 
constant, it will not be optimal to stop acquiring knowledge and reach a state in which no further 
research is undertaken. Production in the second period is a function of consumption and 
knowledge acquired in period one. Romer shows that in a two period model in which 
consumption must be foregone so that new knowledge can be produced, multiple steady states 
can arise and persist in the long run in response to small shocks or initial differences. In this 
model diminishing returns to accumulation of knowledge ensure that production does not 
overheat and a positive externality is necessary for equilibrium to exist. It is increasing returns, 
however, that allow mUltiple equilibria to obtain l . 
Considering the pattern of returns from the opposite stance, Tamura (1991) develops an 
endogenous grO\",th model that predicts convergence of income growth rates and per-capita 
income levels. The motivation for this exercise was to explain the convergence of living 
standards between developed countries. In his model, income converges because human capital 
accumulation (also seen as knowledge) is subject to diminishing marginal returns. It is easier for 
those \'vith below average knowledge to acquire knowledge from the existing knowledge pool. 
than those with above average knowledge to acquire "new knowledge" His assumptions differ to 
those of Romer's in that the human capital spillover is in the production of human capital, not in 
the production of consumption goods. The model predicts that where there are heterogenous 
agents, differentiated only by their initial human capital, convergence will occur and result in a 
homogenous population. 
In the two models above, it is the concavity or convexity of returns to human capital that is 
responsible for the single or multiple equilibrium outcomes. In these models human capital 
enters as a continuous variable. The following two models build on the work of Romer (1986) 
and Lucas (1988) but introduce the increasing returns framework through a discontinuous or 
otherwise termed "non-convex" relationship between human capital and income. 
Galor and Zeira (1993) model a situation in which the existence of both imperfect credit markets 
and non-convex education can generate a poverty trap. In the first period of their two period 
overlapping generations model individuals have the option to invest in education or work as 
unskilled labour. In the second period, those who invested in education in period one work as 
skilled labour and those who did not invest in education continue to work as unskilled labour. In 











period two individuals work, consume and leave bequests. An individual's utility is a function of 
consumption and bequests in period two. Individuals are identical except for differences in their 
initial wealth. The return to skilled labour is greater than the return to unskilled labour so that 
individuals would prefer to obtain training. In their model it is more expensive to borrow than to 
lend so that it is easier for those with initial wealth to invest in education. Furthermore, the 
acquisition of human capital is indivisible. One can only invest in a fixed amount of human 
capital in period one. It is this non-convexity which gives rise to a strong form of increasing 
returns to education. If one does not possess sufficient wealth for the "minimum investment" 
necessary to acquire education, and if the cost of borrowing is too expensive, one will remain 
unskilled in the future. Those with higher wealth will be able to invest in education, reap the 
higher returns and will remain wealthy. Rich and poor dynasties result and the inherited 
distribution of wealth persists. 
Bardahn and Udry (1999) also assume liquidity constraints and non-convex education. Once 
again. an individual is either educated or uneducated. Individuals cannot borrow to finance their 
studies. Rather they must forego consumption, save and then pay for education out of their 
savings. In a steady state, there is a ratio of skilled to unskilled workers that generate a return to 
education that equals the return to physical capital. For any skilled to unskilled labour ratio that 
is less than that of the steady state, the return to education will be greater than the return to 
physical capital and skilled labour will invest in education of future generations. If uneducated 
workers have no assets, there is a possible steady state in which they rationally choose not to 
invest in education of future generations and rather to remain unskilled. This is because an 
individual has to finance education out of savings. To do this, he must forego consumption. If 
the ratio of skilled to unskilled is very low, the wages of the unskilled are very low and the utility 
of current consumption becomes very high. There then exists a steady state where it is too 
expensive for the poor to become educated. The cost of foregoing consumption for long enough 
to save sufficiently to acquire education, becomes too high. 
In the above examples, if the returns to investing in human capital diminished and markets 
functioned perfectly as neoclassical theory predicts, then people could slowly accumulate 
education and convergence in human capital and the income distribution would result. If this 
core assumption of neoclassical economics is violated, however, and returns to education are 
shown to increase, there is a real possibility that low level and high level equilibria may occur 











investments in many individuals may in fact not be useful. The investment required to pull 
someone out of poverty might rather be extremely large. Although very little work of the type 
described above has been done for South Africa (the few examples include Posel (1999), Keswell 
(2001) and Hertz (2001)), it becomes apparent that in order to understand more fully the debate 
about inequality, we should consider the various factors that may lead to low intergenerational 
mobility within a poverty trap framework. Either on their own or in combination credit market 
imperfections, social capital spillover effects and increasing returns to human capital can be used 
to explain why multiple steady states arise and why inequality might persist in the long run. The 
implications for policy are then quite different to those in an analysis where markets function 
smoothly and returns to human capital diminish, with equality resulting in the long run. 
3. Defining Returns to Education: the Mincer Model 
In this section we develop the Mincerian model used to estimate the rate of return measure on 
which we focus in this paper. We also consider potential difficulties with the measure so that we 
can be aware of its limitations from the outset. 
There are typically two methods in the human capital literature that are used to measure the 
pecuniary returns to education. The first and more complete method is to employ traditional cost-
benefit analysis. When measuring returns to education according to this method, one considers 
the present value of future income received from additional education net of the earnings 
foregone and other investments made in acquiring the relevant education level. The internal rate 
of return on the investment is the discount rate that equates the present value of costs incurred 
and the opportunity cost of earnings foregone with the present value of earnings arisingji'om the 
additional education acquired. second method approximates the internal rate of return 
through an earnings function estimation approach. This method has data requirements that are 
often easier to fulfil than the full cost benefit analysis approach, and is applied through regression 
models utilising cross sectional data. Below is a brief presentation of Mincer's choice theoretic 
framework of this model (Mincer (1974:10-1 1)). 
Using the assumption that the time span of a person's earnings life is fixed, let 
n length of working life 
r,· annual earnings of an individual with s years of schooling 
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We let Vs := V,-d in order to find the ratio k"s.d of annual earnings after s years of schooling to 
annual earnings after s-d years of schooling. It is in this way that we find the marginal rate of 
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and from the equation above we have k, e rs (6) 
Taking logarithms we get 
In Ys == In Yo + rS (7) 
which is the canonical earnings function attributed to Mincer. 
The constant term (In Yo) accounts for expected earnings in the absence of any education. The 
coefficient on years of education is interpreted as the marginal internal rate of return on education 
\vhere the costs of education are accounted for in terms offoregone earnings attributed to time 
spent in attaining a certain level of schooling (Rosen (1992». Without including the costs of 
education incurred by government, the coefficient then approximates what is known as the 
private rate of return to time spent in school. 
Experience enters the equation as a quadratic polynomial to more fully account for the 
importance of on-the-job learning in the concave age-earnings profile. The relationship between 
schooling and earnings is linear (both in Sand r) in this specification. The general form of the 
equation is as follows with S referring to the years of schooling, X to experience and 11 to the 
stochastic error term. 
(8) 
Assessing how the returns to education may differ by education level, can be incorporated into 
the model in various ways. Using dummy variables for each year of education allows a unique 
rate of return for each level of schooling. An alternative is to incorporate higher order schooling 
terms into the earnings function. In such an equation there will also be a different rate of return 
for each schooling level. 
Mincer's earnings function has another useful application. It can be used to measure the earnings 
inequality that is attributable to differences in educational attainment. Simply taking the 











function of the distribution of schooling. This is a proxy for earnings inequality attributable to 
schooling inequality. Taking variances of equation (7) we get 
(9) 
(Mincer 1974: 25). The coefficient of determination (Rl) indicates what fraction of the variation 
in schooling explains the variation in log earnings. Focusing on the / term, it can be clearly seen 
from equation (9) that as the rate of return to education increases, so too does earnings inequality. 
Issues of bias concerning measurement of A1incerian returns to education 
The Mincerian return is only an approximate measure and it is necessary to be aware of the 
number of ways the estimate may be biased, either in an upward or downward direction. The 
main areas of bias that have been the subject of much research consider the role of ability, family 
background and school quality as well as measurement error that arises from the misreporting of 
educational attainment. 
Omission of ability from the earnings function is a potential cause of bias in OLS returns to 
education estimates. Ifthere is a positive correlation between education and ability, so that those 
who have greater ability tend to stay in schooling longer, then earnings that are attributed to 
higher levels of schooling may rather be a function of higher ability. When ability is unobserved 
and omitted from earnings function calculations, the estimate of the return to education will be 
biased upwards. Attempts to quantify the ability bias have used instrumental variable approaches 
and data using twins to control for ability differences. Some studies attempt to control for 
"observable" ability using test scores such as IQ tests as measures of cognitive ability. What is 
understood by ability itself is a contentious issue in its own right and whether test scores 
accurately capture ability is another area of debate. Empirical evidence on the magnitude of 
ability bias (when ability is omitted from the earnings function) tends to suggest that it is 
relatively small. Griliches and Mason (1972) find this affect to be around 12 percent while 
Griliches (1977) finds it to be markedly lower and not necessarily in an upward direction. In a 
survey of studies on investments in education, Schultz (1988) places the figure as rnost likely 
fall ing between 5 and 15 percent. 
Omitting family background or social status indicators from the earnings function may also result 











through the possibility that wealthier and "better socially connected" parents will secure more 
education for their children, as well as high-paying jobs (Schultz (1988)). In a comprehensive 
review of recent studies of returns to education Card (1999) finds that parental or sibling 
education is most likely to have a small positive impact on earnings. 
A positive correlation between quality and quantity of education and the omission of a quality 
variable in the earnings function may also result in education estimates being biased. Measuring 
school quality in terms of the relationship between test scores and wage rates has generally 
indicated a limited association between school quality accounted for in this way and earnings 
(Schultz (1988:590): Card and Krueger (1992: 1 )). Research using other indicators of school 
quality such as teacher education levels, teacher: pupil ratios and relative teacher salaries points 
to a much more convincing and significant relationship between school quality and earnings. For 
example, in a study of B raziIi an males aged 15 to 35, Behrman and Birdsall (1983) use average 
teacher education in the area an individual acquired his schooling as a proxy for schooling 
quality. On comparing OLS estimates of standard earnings functions with estimates of 
specifications including the quality variable they find that the "omission of quality" bias on the 
traditional estimate of the private return to education is a very large 75 percent in the upward 
direction. Using a two fixed effects model on United States data, Card and Krueger (1992) 
find that men schooled in states with higher quality education systems (measured by relative 
teacher pay, average term length and the pupil-teacher ratio), earn higher returns to their 
educational investments. Case and Yogo (1999) find corroborative evidence for black South 
African males where the magisterial district in which one is schooled, has a large and significant 
effect on the rate of return to schooling. The extent to which omission of quality from OLS 
regressions biases estimates in the latter two studies, is not however quantified. It is important 
when interpreting returns to education, to be aware that the simple rate of return estimate to 
quantity includes the relationship between omitted quality of schooling and its correlation with 
educational attainment (Schultz (1988)). 
Whereas omission of ability, family background and school quality are most likely to bias OLS 
estimates in an upward direction, measurement error resulting from individuals misreporting their 
educational attainment \vill in most cases bias results downwards. Using data on identical twins 
Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) find that omission of ability variables does not bias returns to 
education estimates upwards but that measurement error in reported education levels biases 











the implications of measurement error when the measurement error is non-classical. This might 
occur as those with the lowest level of schooling cannot underreport and those at the highest level 
cannot overreport their educational attainment. They find that those with completed college 
education have a higher probability of reporting schooling levels correctly than those with less 
than completed college and that OLS estimates of the returns to education will tend to be 
understated for incompleted college and overstated for college completion. Card (1999) finds 
that the downward bias in conventional Mincerian schooling coefficients due to measurement 
error is probably in the order of 10%. When family background effects are controlled for, the 
bias is more likely to be in the region of 15%. 
The final type of bias considered here may be particularly important for a country like South 
Africa. This is sample selection bias that is introduced when using ordinary least squares to 
estimate relationships on a censored sample. In a country such as South Africa with its 
exceptionally high rate of unemployment, all representative surveys contain a high proportion of 
unemployed or zero earners. Through excluding zero earners and by not controlling for the 
probability offinding employment, ordinary least squares estimations may produce biased results. 
Appendix C details why such biases might arise. Furthermore, if the total effect of education is 
the subject of interest and if we are to accurately capture the impact that education has on the 
individual, not only in terms of raising one's earnings once employed, but also in terms of hov.' 
education fares in helping one to find employment in the first place, all labour market participants 
should be included in our analysis. It is for this reason that many recent studies using South 
African data have opted for techniques such as the tobit or Heckman that are better suited to 
censored samples (see for example Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001); Keswell (2001); Rospabe 
(2001»). 
The extent that the various forms of bias matter in terms of the final coefficient on the education 
term depends on the nature of data used and relatedly on the country for which the analysis is 
being performed. Using data for the USA Griliches (1977) finds that when allowing for 
schooling measurement errors as well as omitted variable bias, the biases appear to offset each 
other. A similar result is found with UK data by Deardon (1999). She finds that the effects of 
measurement error bias and what she terms "composition bias" 2 on the OLS schooling coefficient 
: Composition bias refers to the differences that may occur between individuals who self select into 
employment and is equivalent to selection bias discussed above. If the characteristics of those who have 











almost directly offset the impact of omitted ability and family background bias. Such findings 
may hold true for the developed world but it should be borne in mind that issues of bias may have 
a greater impact on results generated from data for developing and less egalitarian societies. 
Using 1993 data on black South African males Hertz (2001: 15) in fact finds that the magnitude of 
the biases is high in the South African context. Hertz CWO 1) assigns 1.2 years of education for 
every completed grade of schooling to control for thel.2 years on average it takes for the African 
males in this sample to complete a level at school. The time spent in graduating from one 
standard to the next is therefore greater than one year and the corresponding earnings foregone 
relate to this longer period. Hertz (2001) controls for omitted variables through household fixed 
effects. Such fixed effects models, however, tend to exacerbate problems of measurement error. 
Using panel data available from a second wave of the survey carried out in 1998. he develops an 
estimator to control for measurement error by comparing the responses on schooling of those who 
self-reported educational attainment in both waves of the survey with those whose schooling was 
reported by another household member in either wave3• Upon correcting for both omitted 
variable bias and measurement error he finds that conventional Mincerian return estimates are 
upwardly biased in the region of 50%. 
In summary then, the Mincerian rate of return to schooling, albeit an approximate measure, is 
simple to obtain through the application of regression analysis to cross-sectional data. It is 
therefore a commonly used measure of the return to education. Even though there are a number 
of ways in which the estimate may be biased, it is not clear that the biases will necessarily change 
the pattern of the returns to different levels schooling, which is the subject of this paper. 
Nevertheless, the potential biases should be taken into account when specifying earnings 
functions and interpreting results. 
4. Existing Evidence: Global and Local 
In Section 2 a number of models were described in which the pattern of returns to education are 
shown to playa fundamental role in explaining why inequality might persist in the long run. For 
theoretical analyses involving the study of intergenerational mobility and poverty traps, the 
importance of correctly ascertaining whether returns are increasing or decreasing becomes 
In further estimations of returns to education Hertz CWOJ) uses higher order polynomials with the 
relationship between schooling and earnings non-linear. In order to control for bias in these more 
complicated specifications he estimates by both fixed effects (which results in estimates being biased 
downwards) and ordinary least squares (which leads to estimates being biased upwards) and takes his 











evident. In Section 4.1 we consider international evidence from the last 40 years and how this 
has influenced the notion that returns to education diminish. In Section 4.2 we review 
evidence on South Africa in an attempt to establish if consistent patterns with regards to the 
returns to schooling emerge. 
4.1 International Evidence 
Early work on returns to education Becker (1964); Hanoch (1967); Hansen (1963) and 
Mincer (1974)) suggested that returns were most likely to be diminishing with the greatest returns 
to education accruing to primary levels of schooling. followed by secondary and then tertiary. 
Such findings have shaped much of the thinking around the relationship between earnings and 
education. They have led to the generally accepted supposition that returns are concave and 
formed the building blocks of theories of growth in which diminishing returns is a core 
assumption and a sufficient condition for the attainment of single steady state equilibria. The 
implication for the distribution of income is that given time, convergence \vill occur. 
The most comprehensive work done in collating and comparing international estimates are the 
cross-county analyses by Psacharopoulos (1973, J 985, 1994 and Psacharopoulos & Patrinos 
(2002). These studies carry through the notion that returns diminish by level of education. 
"The classic pattern offalling returns to education by level of economic development and level of 
education are maintained" (Psacharopoulos (2002: I) Closer inspection of the actual figures, 
however, highlights some important caveats. 












Table J: The Coefficient on Years of Schooling: Mincerian Rates of Return to Education 
'-------,~~----"""'---
2002 1994 
Mean per Mean Years Mean Years 
caEita ($US) of Schooling Coefficient of Schooling Coefficient 
Sub-Saharan Africa 974 7.3 11.7 5,9 13.4 
Latin America/ Caribbean 3 125 8.2 12.0 7.9 12.4 
Asia' 5 182 8.4 9.9 8.4 9.6 
Europe! Middle East! North Africa' 6299 8.8 7.1 8.5 8.2 
DECD 
World 
24582 9.0 7.5 10.9 
9160 8.3 9.7 8.4 




1'\ote: The figures for each region comprise simple unweighted averages compiled from the estimates for 
all countries falling into that region. 
The specified regions do not represent the same group of countries in each paper. As more country-specific 
studies have become available, the dataset has increased so that the 2002 analysis includes many more 
countries per region than the 1985 and 1994 papers. 
It appears that only in the 1994 dataset, do the coefficients decrease consistently by level of 
schooling. The pattern is similar for 1985 but the latest summary statistics for 2002 are not as 
precise. Specifically, Sub-Saharan Africa has, on average, smaller returns than Latin America, 
even though the average educational attainment is almost one year lower in Africa. Furthermore, 
the OECD countries average both higher mean years of schooling and a higher rate of return than 
the non-OECD countries in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. The most recent results 
do not necessarily imply diminishing returns. 
The cross-country studies also compare both social and private rates of return by level of 
education for each region. Inclusion of all costs incurred by society (for example school 
subsidies and teachers salaries) leads to a measure known as the social rate of return lO 
education. This measure is helpful in guiding government investment decisions with regards to 
funding different types of schooling. Our study here is limited to the private rate, which 
according to human capital theory should impact on incentives and investment decisions of the 
individual. It is however, useful to be familiar with the pattern of social rates of returns and how 
this has impacted on general thinking about the relationship between educational attainment and 




















Table 2: Average Social Returns to education levels measured as percentages calculated according to 
the "full method,,4 
2002 1994 1985 
Primary Secondary Tertia~' Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Sccondar~' 
Sub-Saharan Africa 25,4 18,4 1 I.3 24.3 18.2 11.2 26 17 
Latin America! Caribbean 17,4 12,9 12.3 17.9 12.8 12.3 26 18 
Asia" 16.2 11.1 1l.0 19.9 13.3 11.7 27 15 
Europe/ Middle Ea<;ti North Africa* 15,6 9,7 9.9 15.5 1l.2 10.6 13 ]0 
OECD 
World 
8.5 9,4 8.5 14.4 10.2 8,7 na 11 
18,9 13.1 10.8 18.4 13.1 10.9 23a 14 
Source: Psacharopoulos & Patrinos (2002), Psacharopoulos (1994), Psacharopoulos (1985) 
* Non-OEeD 
a average excluding OEeD 
It can be seen from the above that on average social returns do appear to diminish, in the studies 
fronl 1985 and 1994. It is findings that have led to the persistence of the that social 
returns diminish by education level, so that from a public policy perspective primary schooling is 
found to be the most desirable investment and tertiary the least. This pattern holds for the lesser-
developed regions in the 2002 study but not for Europe! Middle East/ North Africa and for the 
OEeD. The latest study is interesting as it brings to light new evidence of how the pattern of 
social returns is likely to change as countries on the development frontier grow and advance 
further. However, again the assertion that returns diminish by level of education is not 
incontrovertible. 
Finally, we consider the evidence on private returns by education level within region. Even 
though the returns are private these studies are not directly comparable with Mincerian returns as 
they are calculated according to the extended cost benefit method. The rates are also average 
rates to a level of education relative to no education, rather than marginal rates from one level to 
another4 • Nevertheless, it is the pattern that is of interest to us and the average rates should reflect 
a similar pattern to that calculated when using the Mincerian approach extended to allow for 
different levels of education (using dummy variables or education splines). 
4 The average rate of return is calculated according to the extended method using the following formula 
(, n 
L (C + IV ), (1 + ,. r' I (H', W () ), (J + ,. t' 
I'" S I I 
where S = years of schooling, C the costs incurred in acquiring S years of schooling and W the earnings 
foregone in this period. Ws the wages earned by someone with S years of schooling and WI! = the wages 


















Table 3: Average Private Returns to education levels measured as percentages calculated according 
to the "full method" 
2002 1994 1985 
Primary Secondary Tertiar\' Primary Secondary Tertian' Primary Secondary 
Sub-Saharan Africa 37.6 24.6 27,8 4l.3 26.6 27.8 45 26 
Latin America! Caribbean 26.6 17.0 19.5 26.2 16,S 19,7 "') .,- 7" ~j 
Asia* 20.0 15.S IS.2 39.0 18.9 19,9 31 15 
Europe! Middle East! ~orth Africa* 13.S 13.6 18.8 17.4 15.9 21.7 17 13 
OEeD 
\Vorld 
13.4 11.3 11.6 21.7 12.4 12.3 na 12 
26,6 17.0 19.0 29.1 IS.1 20.3 31 a 18 
Source: PsacharopouJos & Patrinos (2002), Psacharopoulos (1994), Psacharopoulos (l9S5) 
* ~on-OECD 
a average excluding OECD 
The studies of average private returns reveal a different picture to those of social returns. In 
every case, pri'vate returns to primary education are higher than returns to secondary education. 
However. for the most part returns to higher education are found to be larger than those to 
completed secondary education. In fact, it is only the OECD countries in the 1994 study that 
exhibit on average a diminishing private rate of return to education. As the 2002 study has only 
recently been released (September 2002), it appears that it is probably the previous evidence of 
diminishing returns to both social and private education in the OECD countries that has been 
carried through and become the most cited and generally accepted result. As a large proportion 
of economic modelling is undertaken in these countries it is unsurprising that the assumption of 
diminishing returns is central to many theories and models. We must, however, be alert to the 
fact any such theories do not necessarily apply in the case in which returns to education do not 
diminish. 
It is also clear that there is a time element involved in which the Mincerian returns appear to have 
decreased slightly over time corresponding to an increase in average educational attainment. 
Psacharopoulos & Patrinos (2002) find the same feature when analysing a number of average 
returns estimates from different time periods for specific countries. The implication is that the 
increase in supply of schooling has led to a small decrease in returns. Using the full cost benefit 
analysis method Psacharopoulos (1994) finds that private returns have decreased for both primary 
and secondary education but increased for higher education. This is an interesting result even 
though it does not necessarily carry through to the more recent data. 
equates the present val ue of the costs of S year of schoo 1 ing with the present value of the benefits for a 



















The finding is explained in Carnoy (1995) in which changes in rates of returns over time are 
studied for the United States of America, Columbia, Hong Kong, Kenya and Korea. Carnoy 
(1995) finds that in periods of rapid industrialization, combined with increased access to primary 
and secondary education, the rates of return to schooling appear to decline for each level over 
time. 5 Specifically, returns to primary fall first, followed by secondary and lastly tertiary. He 
finds that not only do the rates decline, but to the extent that the pattern of diminishing returns is 
changed to one of increasing returns. Tertiary returns end up higher than secondary and 
secondary returns higher than primary. This is an important finding as it higblights the 
difficulties of aggregating across countries and also explains why it might be expected that 
returns to education may be convex as opposed to concave. 
Indeed, closer inspection of Psacbaropoulos's results shows that many findings are extremely 
dated and many countries are excluded from tbe analysis altogether. Consideration of a number 
of more recent studies of African countries (all of which employ earnings functions approaches) 
reveals some interesting patterns. Using data from 1994 and 1995 Siphambe (2000) finds that in 
Botswana, Mincerian returns to primary schooling are the smallest, followed by lower secondary, 
teniary, and then upper secondary. Like South Africa, Botswana has high unemployment (21 %), 
especially among the youth, and higb income inequality v.;ith a gini-coefficient of 0.52 in 1994. 
Skyt Nielsen and Westergard-Nielsen (1998) find a similar result for Zambia using 1993 data in 
which Mincerian returns to post-primary education exceed those to primary for urban men and 
\voman6. Teal CWO 1) finds evidence of strongly increasing private returns to education in a study 
of Ghana using data as recent as 1999. Evidence for Egypt mirrors these other studies with 
Wahba (2000) finding increasing returns to education using data from 1988. Appleton, Hoddinott 
and Mackinnon (1996) present further estimates of increasing Mincerian returns for Cote 
d'Ivoire, Kenya and Tanzania. It appears that in Africa (as in the rest of the world), one should 
have no a priori expectation that the returns to education diminish. The possibility of convex 
returns is becoming increasingly likely and must be analysed on a country-by-country basis if one 
is to apply appropriate economic models and policy prescriptions. We now focus our analysis on 
South Africa and review studies that have been conducted using South African cross sectional 
datasets dating from 1990. 
5 This holds for both social and private returns for some of the countries studied and depends on the data 
available. 
6 There are insufficient observations to analyse data on tertiary education or to get significant results for the 











4.2 South African evidence 
In recent years several nationally representative household surveys have become available in 
South Africa resulting in a burgeoning volume of econometric work focusing on labour market 
issues. Cross-sectional earnings functions have been widely used to derive estimates of factors 
such as returns to education. Policy debates over labour supply matters are heavily informed by 
the empirical evidence from such statistical analyses. The results, however, are difficult to 
compare owing to different definitional conventions, estimation techniques and sampling frames. 
In terms of the foundations of both theory and policy, it appears that it would an extremely 
valuable exercise to establish a reliable picture of the pattern of returns to education in the South 
African context. Only once this has been determined, can we begin to analyse the high levels of 
inequality from an appropriate standpoint. 
In this part of the analysis, a number of South African studies that have incorporated some 
measure of the rate of return to education are reviewed. Whereas the focus of some of the studies 
was explicitly schooling in South Africa, for others the estimates considered are one part of a 
\\'ider analysis. We now attempt to collate and compare the results in order to understand 
comprehensively what past research has revealed and whether consistent patterns emerge. 
Making cross study compansons is however complicated by a number factors: First, one is 
considering 9 datasets and any difference in sampling, questionnaire design and data collection 
will more than likely influence results even when the surveys aim to be nationally representative. 
Second, the sample under consideration often differs. Specifically, some researchers run separate 
regressions for each race, others for gender and still others for union as opposed to non-union 
members or those living in rural or non-rural areas. The age specification often differs with some 
authors only including those between the ages of 15-65 while others restrict or expand the age 
range. 
Third, the dependent variable itself ranges from log of hourly wage, to log of monthly wage to 
actual wages and covers a range of full time, part time, formal, informal, casual and temporary 
workers. 
Fourth, the choice of whether to include the unemployed is crucial in terms of the outcomes one 











variation in earnings for the employed, then wage earners will be the focus of the study. It has 
been shown, however, that in South Africa not just earnings, but also the probability of finding 
employment is strongly associated with education (Keswell (2001); Rospabe (2001); Hofmeyer 
(2001 ». If the total effect of education is the subject of interest, then all economically active 
individuals should be included. 
Fifth, estimation approaches vary greatly from study to study. We are confronted with an array of 
regression types from simple ordinary least squares, to censored regression models and methods 
for mUltiple outcomes such as multinomial logits. We then also find that the specifications differ, 
with the number and type of controls included in estimations varying widely. 
Sixth, as the focus is education, it is imperative to take account of the different forms in which 
education enters the models and the subsequent interpretations. In the simplest Mincerian 
equation, education enters linearly into the function as "years of education". Studies on South 
Africa have used either the actual years of education variable, or attempted to take account of 
non-linearities in returns by using splines for different levels of schooling (see for example 
(Mwabu and Schultz (2000); Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001); Rospabe (2001», dummy variables 
for each year (see Moll (1996), Lam (1999); Hofmeyer (2001); Hosking (2001» or through 
higher order education terms (see Kingdon and Knight (1999): Erichsen and Wakeford (2001); 
Hertz (2001 ». When for example, education and age enter the earnings function additively, the 
implicit assumption is that the differential effect of education is constant for all ages. If however, 
the education effect differs l'l'ith age, then this effect can be included in the earnings function in 
the form of interaction terms (see Hertz (2001». 
In Appendix A \ve report on studies that have incorporated some form of education control and 
have drawn conclusions regarding the returns to schooling from their results. The table includes 
the relevant survey data used, the sub-sample of individuals considered, the controls included in 
the regressions, the type of regression applied and therefore whether sample selection has been 
controlled for or not, the form of the dependent variable and most importantly the terms for 
education and their related coefficients. Where there are many alternative specifications 
presented in a paper, those that are most relevant to this paper in terms of ease of comparability 











It can be seen from the table that the primary difficulty in trying to relate one study to another is 
the array of functional forms that the schooling variables take in the various regressions. 
Understanding how to correctly interpret these education coefficients is crucial if we are to draw 
any substantive concl usions from this analysis. We therefore provide a brief explanation of the 
different functional forms. 
The education spline has used repeatedly in South African examples in which it most often 
takes the form of dividing the returns to education into three categories, namely 7 years 
(primary), 12 years (secondary) and 15+ years (tertiary). The coefficient on the spline measures 
the average rate of return to an additional year of the given level of education (for example, 
primary, secondary and tertiary). When the dependent variable is in natural logarithm form. it is 
necessary to take the antilog of the spline coefficient and subtract 1 to arrive at the most accurate 
rate of return for the specification (see Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980)). 
Using dummy variables for each year of education allows for a changing rate of return from year 
to year. Incremental returns are calculated by subtracting the coefficient of a given year from the 
coefficient of the previous or following year. The average annual rate of return from, for 
example, 8 years to 10 years is calculated by subtracting the coefficient on the 8 year dummy 
from that on the 10 year dummy and then dividing by the difference, in this case 2. It is important 
to take cognisance of the fact that even if the coefficients on dummy variables are higher with 
each year of education, this does not mean that the marginal returns are increasing. It is 
necessary to find the incremental return to each year for the pattern of marginal returns to be 
revealed. Once again, when the dependent variable is in log form, one must take the antilog of 
the relevant return (be it incremental or average) and subtract l. 7 
A third manner in which to bring education into the equation is to allow for non-linearities in 
returns through introducing higher order polynomials in education. The coefficients in such a 
specification will not only denote the size of the return but the respective signs ,>vill indicate 
whether the returns are increasing or decreasing. In such a specification there is a different return 
7 Taking the antilog of the coefficient on a spline or dummy is a procedure that although correct, is often 
not performed, as the effect it has on the estimated return is usually negligible. This is indeed the case 
when coefficients are small and for most estimates studied here. When coefficients are large. however. the 
difference can be notable, as can be seen in Table 4 and in Appendix A in which Hosking's (200]) results 











associated with every year of education. The marginal rate of return is calculated by taking the 
derivative with respect to schooling and then calculating the return for each level of schooling. 
From the above we see that it should be possible to manipulate estimates across functional forms 
in such a way that they can be made roughly comparable. Table 4 presents an abridged version of 
the table in Appendix A, where such a process has been attempted. The basis for comparison is 
the primary-secondary-tertiary spline, as this is the most aggregated measure and cannot be 
broken down any further. The returns reported should therefore be interpreted as the average 
private rate of return to an additional year of either primary, secondary or tertiary education. 
Further difficulties arise in terms of different model specifications and most obviously different 
sample subjects. Running separate regressions for those of different race, gender, union status or 
location is likely to produce differing results to having a regression which includes all sample 
subjects and then utilises dummy variables to control for these sub-groups. In Table 4 below we 
have attempted to achieve overall comparability by taking weighted averages of results to attain a 
general figure for the population. (Weights used reflect the percentage of the relevant subgroup 











Table 4: Comparison of the average rate of return to an additional year of education at the primary, 
secondary and tertiary level across South African studies 
Returns to education C 
Originally Spline, 
Mwabu and Schultz 
(2000) 






Vencataehellum (200 I) PSLSD. 1993 
BhoraL et al (2001) OHS.1995 
()ri~ina!ly t)un;mit;:'s8 
Lam (1999) OHS.1995 
Moll (1996) CSS/HSRC, 1990 
Hofmeyer (100 I) OHS.1999 
Hosking (200 I ) Population Census, 1996 
Originally Higher Order" 
Kingdon and Knight 
PSLSD.1993 
( 1999) 







African (male) 0.09 0.17 
All races and genders* 0.05 0.21 
All races and genders* 0.03 0.10 
Skilled workers (male and female. Africans & 0.Q2 0.06 whites)* 
Semiskilled workers (male and female. Africans & 
0.01 0.14 
whites)* 
Africans (male and female)* 0.03 0.10 
African (male) 0.05 0.12 
Africans (male and female)* 0.04 0.10 
African (male) 0.04 0.11 
All races (male) 0.09 0.25 
African (male) 0.02 0.11 
African (male, formal sector union & non-union)* 002 0.09 
All races and om 0.74 
All races and genders 0.04 0.09 
All races and genders* 0.04 0.12 
All races (male) 0.05 0.14 
All races and genders* 0.05 0.12 
All races (male) 0.05 0.14 
0.04 0.12 
A * indicates that \\ here separate regressions for population sub-groups were reported, a weighted average across sub-
groups has been taken. The average reflects the weighting of the subgroup relative to the sample population based on 
the sample sizes used for the respective regressions. 
a For dummy variable studies, the marginal return to each level of education is calculated by subtracting the dummy for 
one level from that of the previous level. In the higher order studies the marginal effect to each year of education is 
calculated taking the derivative with respect to schooling and then calculating the return for each year of schooling 
For both type of manipulations the marginal returnS are then averaged for primary. secondary and tertiary levels to 
calculate the 'mock spline'. 
b There is a difficulty in calculating the marginal return to tertiary education when using dummy variables. This is 
because tertiary education is not homogenous and represents a variety of post secondary educational qualifications that 
take differing amounts of time to complete. It is therefore necessary to make an assumption about the numbcr of years 
spent in acquiring a diploma or degree. The bracketed values indicate a range with the first figure calculated according 
to the assumption of 3 years spent in higher education and the second figure calculated according to the assumption of 
2 years. 





























Upon examining Table 4, certain patterns become evident. For every study, the returns to an 
additional year of primary education are low and below 10%. The median across studies is in fact 
a mere 4%. Many authors have commented on reasons for the relatively low returns to primary 
education in South Africa. Mwabu and Schultz (1996) hypothesise on the excess supply of 
African workers with primary education and the downward pressure this would place on the 
wage. Moll (1996) postulates that poor schooling quality for Africans is likely to be the major 
cause of low returns. Historically, African primary schools had high teacher-pupil ratios relative 
to those of other races and a high percentage of unqualified teachers. Yet another reason why 
returns to primary education may be low in South Africa relative to those in other developing 
countries involves the structure of employment in the economy and the specific basis for large 
benefits accruing to primary level schooling in other developing regions. Colclough (1982) 
explains that primary education is particularly useful in raising the productivity of agricultural 
peasants. This has occurred predominantly in countries where farming is modernizing and 
becoming more technologically advanced. Primary schooling equips farmers with the necessary 
skills to adopt new production methods such as new seed varieties or marketing channels. In a 
reviev.,' of 18 studies of 13 developing countries and controlling for area, land, capital and labour 
time, Lockheed et aI, (1980) (in Colclough (1982» find that in a modernizing environment, 4 
years of primary schooling is associated with a 10 percent annual increase in a peasant farmer's 
output relative to that of a peasant farmer with no education. As South Africa does not have a 
comparable peasant-farming culture, such potential gains from primary education \vill not be 
realized. 
The returns to an additional year of secondary education range more widely across studies. The 
median value is 12%. An extremely clear pattern, however, emerges in that the returns to 
secondary education are greater than those to primary. This is common across all studies and 
differs from Psacharopoulos's (1985, 1994, & Psacharopoulos & Patrinos (200))) general 
viOrldwide pattern of primary returns being well in excess of secondary returns (see Table 3). 
The returns to tertiary education fluctuate considerably and are in certain instances more difficult 
to interpret. This is largely due to the differences in the type of tertiary education available and 
the survey questionnaire designS Moreover, the returns to different types of higher education 
8 In order to ca\cul ate the marginal return to a year of schooling, the time spent in acquiring that level of 
schooling must be incorporated. Dummy variables for a particular level or type of tertiary education often 











will vary greatly. We find a median return to an additional year of tertiary education of 19%. 
Abstracting from dummy variable studies (for the reasons discussed above) it is evident that there 
are two studies that do not show that the returns to tertiary education necessarily being higher 
than the returns to secondar/. 
Considering more closely Michaud and Vencatachellum's analysis (2001), it becomes clear that 
when running separate regressions for union and non-union members, the returns for both male 
and female union-members increase by level of education. This pattern does not hold for non-
union members. There are two probable reasons for this. Firstly, the sample of non-unionised 
African males with tertiary education is particularly small and secondly the regressions are run 
including a significant 'skilled-employment' dummy. This dummy is likely to be highly 
correlated with tertiary education and is in all likelihood diminishing part of its partial effect. 
The other study of interest in this regard is Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001). The authors use what 
they term a "three stage sample selection model" for which coefficients on the education splines 
are reported for each stage. They estimate equations for labour market participation, employment 
and earnings sequentially using probits in the first two stages. In the employment probit, the 
coefficients are as expected. The spline for tertiary education is significant in influencing the 
probability of having a job and is much higher than for secondary and primary returns. In the 
earnings equation, however, the coefficients on tertiary education are insignificant. The authors 
comment that this infers that although tertiary education is important in raising the probability of 
employment, it is not relevant as a predictor of the level of earnings for Africans. This result is in 
direct contrast with both Hofmeyer (200 1) and Rospabe (200 1) that find tertiary education as a 
significant estimator in both their employment and earnings equations. The inconsistency could 
reflect differences in the datasets used (Hofmeyer (200 I) and Rospabe (2001) use the OHS, 
1999), or it could be a consequence of inaccurate appl ication of the econometric techniques. 
Specifically, Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001) report on using the Heckman two-step approach when 
estimating the inverse Mills ratio in stage one for its inclusion in stage 2. The Heckman 
estimator, however, provides incorrect estimates of the standard errors of the coefficients. (Breen 
(1996: 17)) No mention is made of correcting the variance-covariance matrix for such errors from 
stage one to stage two which could lead to biased results. Furthermore, as with Michaud and 
o The term on the tertiary spline for Bhorat's (2000) semi-skilled workers is insignificant. We ignore this 












Vecatachellum (2001), a high association between the tertiary spline and dummy variables for 
professionals and perhaps managers is probably eroding the explanatory power of the tertiary 
education coefficient. 
Although not exhaustive, in the majority of cases presented in Table 4, the average return to an 
additional year of tertiary education exceeds that of an additional year of secondary education. 
This result corresponds to the evidence for Non-OECD countries (see Table 3). It is also 
unsurprising for a country like South Africa in which global technological advances and growth 
of microelectronics has meant that much of the employment that has been created in the last 
decade has been in skilled professions (Bhorat (2001 a)). Between 1990 and 1998, formal sector 
employment of unskilled and semi-skilled workers decreased by 19 percent whereas employment 
of highly skilled labour rose by 12% (Edwards (2002)). During the apartheid era, access to 
higher education was severely limited for all race groups other than Whites. This has resulted in 
the economy being skills constrained, even though it is experiencing mass unemployment of 
unskilled and semi-skilled labourers 1o • In light of the skills shortage, a significant premium to 
tertiary education would therefore be expected. 
From the above analysis it appears that secondary returns are greater than primary returns and 
that tertiary returns are probably greater than secondary returns. Such an increasing pattern 
across the three education levels is indicative of a convex relationship between education and 
earnings in South Africa. The relationship seems plausible for a country that has taken a growth 
path experienced by South Africa in the last decade. Increasing access to primary and secondary 
education \\'ill have led to increased supply of workers with these levels of education and in all 
likelihood would have depressed returns. The surplus labour economy and high unemployment 
rate will serve to aggravate this situation. Furthermore, increasing demand for skilled labour will 
lead to a skills premium that will increase the return to higher education relative to lower levels. 
The apparent increasing returns appear highly plausible and indeed seem to reflect a similar 
pattern to other African countries discussed previously (see section 3.1). 
Many of the South African studies reviewed do not only present estimates of the pattern of 
returns to education, but also make comparisons across different sub-groups of the population (for 
example, by race, gender or location) in cases in which separate regressions have been run. 











In the South African studies considered in this section, almost all regressions run by race, gender, 
union status and location exhibit the pattern of within group increasing returns. This in tum 
implies that we might expect to see increasing within group inequality. In fact in an analysis of 
discrimination, Moll (2000) finds that from 1980 to 1993, within race earnings inequality has 
increased. Convexity in the returns to education could be a major reason. 
Attempts to compare relative returns across groups become particularly confusing and illuminate 
very little. It is worth noting that in regressions by Mwabu and Schultz (2000) and Hosking 
(2001) which are run separately by race, Africans are generally found to have higher returns to all 
levels of education. This does not imply that Africans earn more by education level, but rather 
that their increase in earnings per additional year of education is greater. The reason for this 
would be that when Africans invest in additional education, they forego only a low level of 
earnings, thus leading to returns that are higher as they are off a particularly low investment base. 
Higher returns to education for Africans would imply decreasing between race inequality. No 
consistent pattern emerges by gender. 
It is worth cautioning on the interpretation and comparisons of such results. In terms of returns to 
education, when separate regressions are run by race, the Mincerian estimate refers to, for 
example, the return to one additional year of schooling, if one is African, relative only to other 
individuals who belong to this race group. When separate regressions are run and then compared, 
total non-correlation of both parameters and the error terms is assumed. In earnings function 
regressions where the R2 is typically in the region of 40%, most variation in earnings remains 
unexplained. If there are similar processes driving this unexplained variation, then this 
covariance between the error terms should be accounted for. In the case of separate earnings 
functions, it is likely that between group comparisons yield inconsistent results because they are 
not based on a correct "between group mean". Alternative techniques that might better capture 
probable covariance across error structures (as well as allowing for flexible parameter estimates 
for each group) include estimating a single equation and including dummy variables for race 
interacted with the education term or using seemingly unrelated regression (see Griffiths, W.E., 
Carter Frill, R. and G.G Judge (1993), chapter 17). 
In this section we have reviewed evidence on returns to education for South Africa and the rest of 
the world. We have seen that even though original studies found returns to be diminishing, there 











is no a priori reason to expect that this is any longer the case. Indeed, the pattern in South Africa 
appears to be increasing, a result that holds true for other African countries we have considered. 
5. Empirical Analysis 
The literature review revealed that the pattern of returns to education in South Africa are most 
probably convex. In the remainder of the paper we use empirical methods in an attempt to verify 
these findings and gain a more detailed understanding of the pattern of returns to schooling in the 
country. We run a number of earnings functions on 4 nationally representative datasets to 
ascertain whether the apparent convexities are a robust feature of the data. We also employ semi-
parametric techniques to explore the relationship between education and earnings in more detail. 
5.1 Data 
The original surveys selected for the study were the October Household Surveys for 1995, 1997. 
1998 and 1999", the Project for Living Standards or PSLSD for (1993), the K waZulu-Natal 
Income Dynamics or KIDS Surveys (1993 and 1998) and the Labour Force Survey (September 
2000). O"'ing to completeness of data reported and representativeness of the surveys, we report 
results for 4 of the surveys here, namely the PSLSD, 1993, OHS, 1995, OHS, 1997 and LFS, 2000. 
In the simple Mincerian earnings function, the key variables of interest are education, earnings 
and age (or experience). In our analysis we define education as completed years of schooling. 
Earnings is measured as 'total monthly pay including overtime and bonuses and before any tax or 
other deductions'12. The employed are restricted to full-time wage employees. The unemployed 
are defined according to the broad definition, in which discouraged work-seekers are included. 
Other covariates are race, gender, union status and province. Appendix B details issues 
concerning the definitions of the employed, the unemployed (or censored observations) and 
earnings, as well as, the representativeness of the tinal datasets used in our study. 
Below is a table of descriptive statistics based on the final sample used for each of the 4 datasets 
that are carried through this analysis. 
II The OHS, 1996 was excluded primarily due the nature of the income data which were only reported in 
categories. OHS, 1996 is also least comparable with other years as its sample size is approximately half 
that of the other years and the enumerator areas were selected on a different basis. OHS, 1994 was also 
excluded as it was in a sense the "pilot OHS" and also had only 1 000 enumerator areas as opposed to the 
3000 for the surveys of 1995,1997,1998 and 1999. 
12 Although net earnings after tax would have been the preferred variable, no data was collected on income 











Table 5: Descriptive Statistics reflecting the final sample analysed for PSLSD, 1993, OHS, 1995, 
OHS, 1997 and LFS, 2000 
~.---.. -. 
Economically active population (EAP) under 
















mean age of censored observations 
mean age of employed 
A verage Educational attainment 
mean education of censored observations 




A verage income for employed 
Mean income of employed 
Mean log income of employed 
Median 
Notes: 























( 4.19) (409) 
50.58 40.68 
49.42 59.32 
J 723.46 1934.35 
(3464.60) (223136) 
6.87 7.08 
( 1.12) (1.04 ) 
1000.00 1268.00 
""--,,,---,..--




79.61 79.76 72 
14.32 12.48 II 
1.84 2.16 3 
4.23 5.60 14 
49.44 49.51 54 
50.56 50.49 46 
44.07 39.07 36 








( 10.51) ( 10.54) 
7.82 8.50 












a The 'Actual EAP' statistics are the average proportions by race, gender and location of the economically 
active population calculated from the weighted sample surveys (PSLSD 1993, OHS, 1995, OHS, 1997 and 
LFS, 2000). They therefore indicate what the breakdown by race, gender and location should be given no 
missing information and totally representative sampling. 











It is important to note that all the surveys are nationally representative and the samples used 
consist of a large number of data points. The economically active population ranges from almost 
8500 in PSLSD, 1993 to over 31 500 for OHS, 1995. 
Given no missing income information, the proportion of the economically active population by 
race, gender and location should be similar to the values indicated in the final column. It is 
evident that OHS, 1995 most closely approximates the actual breakdowns for both race and 
gender. The OHS, 1997 and LFS, 2000 clearly under-represent Whites and over represent 
Africans. This is predominantly due to these surveys undersampling Whites and then weighting 
up the aggregates. OHS, 1997 and LFS, 2000 also reveal a higher proportion of economically 
active females. This could reflect a trend of increases in female labour force participation over 
the timespan under consideration (see Posel and Casale, 200 I). The LFS, 2000 is the most 
representative by 10cation13. There could also be a time effect picked up here reflecting high 
levels of annual rural to urban migration. Such apparent trends, however, may be a function of 
the sample design. 
The percentage censoring ranges from 41 to 55 percent with OHS, J 995 once again revealing the 
most realistic level. The average age of the employed rises from a minimum of 36 years for 
PSLSD, 1993 to a maximum of 39 years in LFS, 2000. The average age of the censored 
observations is a fairly constant around 31. Increasing youth unemployment and low labour 
absorption rates would fit well with such a picture of a \,videning in the age gap between the 
employed and unemployed. So too would the apparent increase in mean educational attainment 
of the censored observations for which the statistics indicate has increased by 1 Y2 years. 
Average income for the employed under consideration increases from R 1732 in 1993 to R2444 in 
2000. Income data for 1993, 1995 and 2000 suggests that nominal earnings have increased by 6 
percent per annum over the period. With average inflation of approximately 7% per year from 
1993 to 2000, these seem like reasonable estimates indicating that their has been slight negative 
growth in real earnings over the period. The average income data for OHS, 1997 is lower due to 
the undersampling of Whites and Asians and those with higher education. 
13 The breakdown by location for the PSLSD, 1993 is quite different from the other surveys. This is 











The OHS, 1995 therefore seems the most representative survey and this should be kept in mind 
when analysing results. The LFS, 2000 is the only survey whose exclusive purpose was to 
explore the labour market and therefore data for labour market variables may be captured better 
than for the other surveys. The time dimension may playa role when comparing PSLSD, 1993 
with later surveys as the labour dynamics in the last 7 years may mean that there have been 
changes in the covariates used in the analysis. Finally, OHS, 1997 seems to be the least 
representative of the surveys. This should be taken into account when analysing differences in 
outcomes between this and other datasets. 
5.2 Estimation 
In this section we develop the empirical model estimated and hypothesize on expected results. 
The aim of the empirical analysis was to estimate the total private returns to education thereby 
including the role of education in terms of influencing the probability of finding employment as 
well as its effect on earnings. Censored observations are therefore included in all our models. 
To begin with, the return is estimated using a parametric regression framework. A sample 
selection problem presents itself in that earnings are captured only for those who are employed. 
This situation lends itself to using a censored regression approach. We choose the tobit as our 
sample selection model in preference to the Heckman as identification of the Heckman with 
comparable variables across surveys would be an extremely arduous task. We also present OLS 
estimates for comparative purposesi 4 • We ran ten different earnings functions for each of the four 
datasets using both the tobit and ordinary least squares estimators l5 • 
The dependent variable in all equations is the log of gross monthly earnings. 16 In the first 
equation education is brought in as a discrete term as "years of education" with "age" and "age 
squared" as the other explanatory variables this is the Mincerian earnings function using age 
~--~---------
14 Although running OLS regressions on a censored sample should produce biased estimates (see Appendix 
C), the coefficients are more easily interpreted than for maximum likelihood models which are inherently 
non-linear. If the marginal effects for the different types of models do not differ widely, OLS estimates can 
aid in simplifYing interpretations. 
IS The reason for running a number of different earnings functions was to check the consistency of the 
coefficients as further control variables were added. 
:6 The choice of using monthly earnings as opposed to hourly is largely a function of the question dealing 
with "hours usually worked per week" that changes across surveys. As our sample of interest is limited to 











instead of potential experience which is estimated according to Mincer (1974) as "Age-
Educatiol1-6·'. [7. "Age" is used in preference to "experience" as the Mincerian proxy is 
unreliable for a country such as South Africa with a labour market characterized by high levels 
and long periods of unemployment and a schooling system with high repetition rates. In other 
equations we add higher order education terms to allow for any non-linearities in the returns to 
education. We also include "age-education" interaction terms to control for the differing average 
educational attainment of various age groups. These terms are especially important in that they 
circumvent a particular problem with interpreting the education coefficient as a return. The 
traditional Mincerian estimate overstates the opportunity cost of early years of education as 
young school going children would generally not be earning if they were not at school (do not 
forego the equivalent years of earnings), or would be earning substantially less than adults 
(Psacharopoulos, 1994: 1326). The rate of return to low levels of education is therefore generally 
understated. Interaction effects control for this form of bias. 
Single earnings functions are estimated with covariates such as race. gender, location or union 
status included as dummy variables. The single regression approach is taken so as not to assume 
total independence of the unobserved factors driving the returns to education for the full-time 
wage earners across subgroups. Between race comparisons are made later in the semi-parametric 
analysis in which race-education interaction effects are included. 
Finally, it is acknowledged that there are many different kinds of biases working in different 
directions that may impact on our results. Indeed, Hertz (2001) has found problems of 
measurement error and omitted variable bias to be large for South Africa. The aim of this 
empirical work is to estimate a set of functions that are as consistent as possible, and subject to as 
little distortion as possible through additional econometric manipulation. Inclusion of any 
sophisticated variables across surveys in which the questionnaire design differs will introduce 
further noise into our results. Moreover, the lack of data on factors such as school quality and 
ability (for example test scores) across surveys limits the potential to control for these types of 
biases. It is chosen therefore only to control for sample selection bias. Given the high 
unemployment rate in the country, we believe it is important to include the effect of education on 
that the pattern of hours worked over the lifecycle is fixed exogenously, it makes little ditference what 
measure of earnings is used, be it hourly, weekly, monthly or annual (Willis, 1986). 
17 Even though 'years of education" is discrete rather than continuous, as it is roughly monotonic it is 











the probability of finding employment. The tobit is used to control for sample-selection effects, 
the formal model of which is as follows; 
y, = x;/3 + iii if y, > 0 
,V, 0 otherwise 
where YI is measured in our model as the log of monthly earnings, x, is the matrix of relevant 
explanatory variables, fJ is the associated coefficients matrix and Jii the stochastic error tenn, 
assumed identically and independently distributed. 
For}', = 0 
Wefindpr{y'i O)=pr(ui<-x/fJJ (1-$,) 
Which uses the result of cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable 
\.vith mean zero and variance d, (see equation (5) Appendix C) 
For YI >0, we use the result for the standard normal density function evaluated at X, fJlaor rPl (see 
equation (8) Appendix C) and find 
Using maximum likelihood to solve we get the likelihood function 
I n [1- <l>J n ¢[(Yi - x:/3) / 0"] 
Y,_.y/=O .\,Ti>O 
where the first term is equivalent to the probit reflecting the probability of an observation being 
censored and the second term to OLS estimated on only uncensored observations. 
The log likelihood function (shown below) is then maximised by taking the derivative with 











L = L. log(l ~ <Pi) + L log j2;;;I- L J 
.I, .I, =0 ir, >0 27rG" I 2G" 
The values of /3 and (J that maximise the log likelihood do not have closed form solutions. They 
must therefore be found through numerical methods. This also implies that the marginal effects 
of particular explanatory variables have to be evaluated at relevant values of x" the most common 
being evaluation at the means. 
Most of our discussion of the results will be based on the final specification in which all control 
variables referred to above are included. It is expected that the coefficient on female will be 
negative relative to male and that union members will earn a premium relative to non-union 
members. Africans are expected to be the most disadvantaged relative to whites, with Coloureds 
and Asians also exhibiting lower earnings. All provinces other than the Western Cape are likely 
to have negative coefficients relative to Gauteng. The concave age earnings profile should reveal 
a positive coefficient on the "age" term and a negative on the "age squared" term. We expect 
schooling to have a positive impact on log earnings and study the coefficients in detail to reveal 
the pattern of returns by level of educational attainment. 
5.3 Results 
Regressions were run using both the tobit and OLS including the zero earners and it was found 
that the OLS and evaluation of the tobit at the means of the explanatory variables yielded 
(surprisingly) similar results. Referring to Table 6, Table 7 and Appendix D the regression 
results for both the OLS and tobit reveal that the coefficients tend to have the expected signs. 
The concave age-earnings relationship is evident with the "age" coefficient taking a positive sign 
and "age?" a negative. Union membership contributes positively to earnings as does being white 
relative to the other races. The province dummies have the expected sif:,'11s for J 995 and 2000 
with coefficients negative with respect to "Gauteng" except for the "Western Cape" which is 
insignificant in 1995 and positive in 2000. An unexpected result emerges with positive and 
significant coefficients on the province dummies for "Northwest" and "Mpumulanga" in PSLSD, 
1993 and for "Northern Cape", "Free State" and "Mpumulanga" for OHS, 1997. Closer 











considerably higher than that for the above-mentioned provinces lB. It is therefore the inclusion of 
the censored observations and the probability of finding employment that is driving this result. 19 
We now concentrate our discussion on the role of education. 
Looking closely across the datasets at Specification I, which is the basic Mincerian earnings 
function, it can be seen that the coefficient on the "years of education" variable ranges from 17 to 
26.4 % for OLS and from 15 to 26.6% for the tobit at the mean of the explanatory variables. This 
result will be higher than findings where only the employed are included as the impact of 
education on the probability of finding employment is incorporated in the result. (Hertz (2001) 
for example finds an average coefficient of 0.114 for African males in the PSLSD, 1993 when he 
includes only the employed. Hosking (2001) finds a coefficient of 0.141 for Africans using the 
1996 Census and a coefficient of 0.189 "Ehen running the Mincerian earnings function for all 
races.) ~o The coefficient of detennination (R~) ranges from 12% to 19% indicating the effect of 
education and age in explaining the variation in log earnings is large and significant. This implies 
that differences in education are an important determinant of earnings inequality. Including 
higher order education terms into the model leads to the R2 being on average 2.8 percentage 
points higher indicating better explanatory power with the more flexible functional form. 
i 8 The "effective rate of unemployment" for Gauteng is 52% as opposed to 40% for Northwest and 37% for 
Mpumalanga for SALDRU93. In the OHS97 the percentage censoring is 54% for Gauteng as opposed to 
37%, 45% and 49% for Northern Cape, Free state and Mpumalanga respectively. It should be noted that 
the percentage cnesoring rates are the rates on which our data is based and not necessarily a reflection of 
the actual relative unemployment rates per province. 
19 Initially a dummy variable controlling for location (urban=], rural=O) was included but in specification 9 
the effect of being in an urban area was negative for all datasets and for both OLS and the tobit The 
unemployment rate of urban areas was however lower than for rural areas and mean income of the entire 
labour force also a great deal higher in urban areas. Through further testing it appears that including the 
unemployed in the regression introduces a degree of covariation with regards to the right hand side 
variables. "Urban" covaries with education, race and union status. As inclusion of , 'urban" biases results, 
we run our regressions excluding it. 
The inclusion of only full time wage employees as the 'employed' should also serve to drive estimates of 












Table 6: The Mincerian Earnings Equation: Specification 1 - Marginal effects for OLS and Tobit 
estimators 
Constant -5.713 * -9.750 " -5.751 • -9.588 • -4.923 * -9.190 " -7.546 * -12.865 " 
(0.319) (0.378) (0.177) (0.216) (0201) (0.235) (0.179) (0215) 
Age 0.339 * OA07 " 0.336 " OA09 • 0.292 * 0.366 • 0399 * 0.517 • 
(0.0\8) (0.02\) (0.009) (0.01\) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.01 I) 
Age Squared -0.003 * -0.004 * -0.003 • -0.004 • -0.002 * -0.003 • -0.003 " -0.005 • 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education in years 0.245 " 0.232 " 0.263 • 0.265 • 0.\71 * 0.152 " 0.202 " 0.\82 * 
0.009 (0.01) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (O.005) (0006) 
n 8487 8487 31777 31777 30956 30956 29949 29949 
RC 0.162 0.\80 0.\21 0.192 











Table 7: Specification 10 - Marginal effects for OLS and Tobit Estimators (Higher order education 
terms and controlling for all other covariates) 
.~-----~--" 
OLS93 Tobit 93 OLS95 Tobit 95 OLS97 Tobit 97 OLSOO Tobit 00 
~"---"" 
Constant 1091 • -2"9270 * 0"560 •• -3"037 • 1019 * ·3060 • ·0"021 -5" 187 • 
(0412) (0510) (0"244) (0321 ) (0"261 ) (0317) (0288) (0359) 
Age 0"208 • 02750 • 0"247 * 0"328 * 0174 • 0238 • 0"238 • 0.344 • 
(0018) (0022) (0010) (0012) (0"011 ) (0013) (0"010) (0013 ) 
Age Squared -0"002 • -00030 • ·0002 • ·0003 • ·0002 • ·0002 • -0002 • ·0"003 • 
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0"000) (0"000) (0000) (0000) (0000) 
Female -0"545 • ·05770 • -1.362 • ·1716 • ·0 837 • ·0"918 • ·0"682 • -0" 758 • 
(0058) (0070) (0031 ) (0039) (0031) (0037) (0031 ) (0037) 
Afncan -3" 165 • -2"8380 · -2.498 • ·2571 • -2293 • ·2019 • ·2597 • ·2"243 • 
(0 113) (0127) (0055) (0066) (0082) (0089) (0"073 ) (0078) 
Coloured ·2" 117 • -1.6420 • ·1257 • -1.079 • -1.186 • -0" 785 • -I "504 • ·1.048 · 
(0"154) (0"173) (0"067) (0081 ) (0095) (0"103) (0"088) (0096) 
ASIan -0"894 • -0.5390 •• ·0535 • -0434 • -0.206 0" 188 -0622 • -0365 • 
(0189) (0211 ) (0093 ) (0 Ill) (0" 138) (0 151) (0 128) (0" 138) 
Education In years 0"220 ·0"0650 0"841 • 0.929 • 0"547 • 0"595 • OA85 • 0.442 * 
(0"167) (0"207) (0096) (0125) (0 101) (0121 ) (0 106) (0.129 ) 
(Education in Years)' ·0.089 • -00500 -0.191 • -0215 • ·0.130 • -0.150 • ·0.106 , -0.107 • 
(0031 ) (0.038) (0017) (0021 ) (0.018) (0021 ) (0017) (002) 
(Education in 0006 ' 0.0050 .. 0.010 , 0.012 • 0.007 • 0.008 • 0005 • 0.006 , 
(0.002) (0.002) (000 I) (0.001) (0001 ) (0001) (0001 ) (0001 ) 
Age' Education ·0005 0.0010 ·0021 , -0014 -0015 • -0017 • -0.011 , -0011 • 
(0004 ) (0005 ) (0.001) (0.003 ) (0003) (0003) (0003) (0003 ) 
Age* EducatlOr.' 0.002 ** 0.0010 0.004 • 0.005 · 0.003 • 0.004 • 0.002 • 0.002 • 
(0001) (0001 ) (0.000) (0001 ) (0.000) (0001 ) (0000) (0001 ) 
Age' EducatIOn·' 0.000 .. 00000 ••• 0000 • 0000 , 0"000 • 0000 • 0.000 , 0.000 • 
(0000) (0000) (0.000) (0000) (0.000) (0000) (0000) (0000) 
Union 3.232 * 2.9060 • 3043 * 3.140 • 4033 • 3A36 * 4.324 , 3.545 • 
(0085) (0094) (0.040) (OO48) (0.043 ) (0047) (0044) (0048) 
Western Cape 1 132 '" I 1310 • -0041 0.OJ9 0.920 • 0.942 • 0408 • 0.393 • 
(0136) (0 157) (0068) (0083) (0072) (0083 ) (0073) (0083 ) 
Eastern Cape ·0.349 • -05590 • -1068 • -128J · -0800 ' -1019 * ·0924 • ·1.115 • 
(0112) (0142) (ODS7) (0072) (0060) (0076) (0.060) (0.073 ) 
l'orthern Care 0.007 0.0480 -0.594 · ·0.598 • OA16 * 0.518 • -0168 **. -0083 • 
(0260) (0305) (0.089) (0112) (0.088) (0099) (0087 ) (0099) 
Free State -[024 • -18790 • -0.238 • ·0086 0.437 0.584 • -0340 • ·0192 * 
(0170) (0252) (0.063) (0.078) (0062) (0073) (0065 ) (0075) 
K waZulu-Natal 0.009 -0.0570 -0358 * -0.396 ·0.493 -0.672 • ·0402 • -0.453 • 
(0102) (0126) (0.055) (0068) (0054 ) (0066) (0054 ) (0064) 
Northwest PrO\"lnCe 1.038 • 11330 • ·0.269 • ·0.158 • 0.032 0.066 -0388 * -0424 • 
(0114) (0.135) (0.067 ) (0083 ) (0060) (0072) (0059) (007) 
1vlpumulanga 1.181 • IJ760 • -0.368 • ·OA06 • O"~ • . .)-'''' 0423 • ·0.520 • ·0.597 · 
(0.115) (0135) (0064) (008) (0.063 ) (0074) (0066) (0.079) 
Northern PrOl"lnce 0.101 0.1160 -0.869 • -L075 • ·0096 -0.063 -0.785 * ·0.947 • 
(0.118) (0.144) (0070) (009) (0064) (0077) (0062) (0076) 
n 8487 8487 31777 31777 30956 30956 29949 29949 
R' 0.449 0441 0.428 0474 
·50255 
Notes: 
Table 6 and Table 7 report estimates for both ordinary least squares and the tobit (derived above) where the 
dependent variable is the log of monthly earnings from full time formal sector workers. Given the non-
linearity of the tobit, the estimates reported are the marginal effects of the model evaluated at the mean of 
the relevant explanatory variables according to the formula oECvl:::: (J)(z)jJ, 
ox; 
* implies statistical significance at the 1% level, **implies significance at the 5% level, and *** implies 











On adding further controls to the basic Mincerian equation it can be seen that the coefficient on 
education reduces quite substantially (refer to specifications 8 and 9, Appendix D). This indicates 
that the education term and other right hand side variables are associated (Griliches and Mason 
1972). Through deeper analysis it is found that for the OHS, 1997 and the LFS, 2000, it is largely 
the inclusion of the union dummy that is driving this result whereas for the PSLSD, 1993 and the 
OHS, 1995 it is the race effect2l. Omission of these variables then biases education estimates 
upv,rards. On inclusion ofthe controls for race and union, the returns to education at the mean are 
extremely stable for both the tobit and OLS, across the different functional forms and when other 
controls such as gender and province are added. Furthermore, the calculated total return of 
education at the means for specification 10 is very similar to the (average) coefficient on the 
single "years of education" term for specification 9 (including race, gender and union: see 
Appendix D). This establishes that our results are consistent across years and specifications once 
race and union effects are included. 
Considering the higher order education terms reveals a particularly robust result across 
specifications and datasets: The signs of the coefficients are positive on the first order term, 
negative on the second order and again positive on the third order indicating an S-shaped 
relationship between education and earnings. The only exception to this pattern is the tobits using 
the PSLSD, 1993. It is not surprising that the earnings-education relationship seems to differ for 
PSLSD, 1993. This may be a function of survey design or in fact a time dimension. We are 
dealing with a quite different generation of school leavers in 1993 and ~00022. 
To calculate the marginal effect of education from the equations with higher order terms, it is 
necessary to take the derivative oflog earnings with respect to education as follows. 
Given the equation 
Lmvage a + + 
Take the derivative to get 
~I Further regressions were run with different combinations of variables to establish at which point the 
coefficients changed. 
:2 Rerunning the ;egressions for PSLSD, 1993 with only a square and cubic term for education and the age-
education interactions, yields highly significant coefficients on both these terms. Predicted returns from 














<5..j.. 2EEducation + 3rEducation2 + 7JAge + 2K(Age x Ed) + 3J~(Age x Ed 2) 
The marginal effects can then be calculated for a specific level of education at a given age by 
substituting into the equation above. The tables below shows the marginal returns for a 40 year 
old at 7, 10, 12 and 15 years of education and the average returns per year of primary, secondary 
and tertiary education. These results are taken from specification 10.23 
Table 8: Marginal Effect of Education for a 40 year old 
Years of Schooling OLS93 Tobit93 OLS95 Tobit95 OLS97 Tobit97 OLSOO TobitOO 
7 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06 0,04 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
10 0,28 0.27 0.27 0,29 0.20 0,19 0,15 0.14 
12 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.53 0.35 0.36 0.32 0.32 
15 0,80 0.89 0.85 1.05 0.65 0.76 0.54 0.61 
"'-- "''''/,.,.,...--
Table 9: Average Effect of an additional year of Education for a 40 year old 
Years of Schooling OL893 Tobit93 OL895 Tobit95 OLS97 Tobit97 OLSOO TobitOO 
.--.~~~ 
3 - 7 0,02 0.02 0.00 -0,01 -0,02 -0.03 -0.04 -0,06 
8 - 12 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.15 
13- 15 0.68 0.73 0.71 0.86 0.54 0.61 0.54 0.61 
Notes: 
The average effect is calculated by averaging the marginal effect for each year of the relevant education 
span 
The above result shows that across datasets the pattern of returns is increasing. We see the 
previously discussed very low returns to 7 years of education as found by most other research on 
South Africa. We then see the returns increasing to high levels at 12 years and extremely high 
levels at 15 years. Such a pattern of returns is clearly indicative ofa convex relationship between 
education and earnings. 24 
:3 In order to calculate the correct coefficients for the tobit, the marginal effects were re-estimated for each 
given year of education with age specified at 40 and all other variables held at their means. This should 
give the marginal effect for the "average 40 year old" in the sample, 
24 The returns to an additional year of higher education do however seem particularly high. Hertz's (200 I) 
previously mentioned finding of extreme upward bias in the Mincerian coefficients indicates that the actual 
return estimates should in all probability be much lower. However. it is predominantly the level of returns 
that change on correction, with the pattern remaining fairly stable. As the focus of our exercise is the 
pattern of returns, we do not discuss the levels of returns in any detail. It is important to notice, however, 
that the absolute returns vary substantially across datasets, This finding warns at drawing conclusions 












Although the pattern of increasing returns found above is robust across datasets and appears 
plausible for a country like South Africa, parametric analysis still constrains the data to quite 
specific relationships. There may be turning points that the higher order education terms are not 
in fact capturing. To better visualize the relationship between log earnings and education, it is 
useful to employ semi-parametric techniques. These will potentially reveal turning points or 
other characteristics of the data that may be concealed when using purely parametric methods. 
The non-parametric approach we use is the LOWESS method or Locally Weighted Scatter Plot 
Smoothing. LOWESS works by starting with a local polynomial least squares fit and then 
iteratively identifies weights and resmoothes a number of times (HardIe (1995: 192-193)). In 
LOWESS a separate weighted regression is run for every datapoint. The estimation process 
weights the values closest to a particular point the highest and those furthest away the least. The 
local nature of the regressions means that LOWESS is particularly useful in the presence of 
outliers (Stata Reference Manual, 2001: 170-171). The approach we use is semi-parametric in 
that the observations on which the LOWESS is performed are the predicted values of the natural 
log of earnings for each year of education obtained from the parametric regressions discussed 
above. The reason we use the predicted as opposed to the actual values, is that in this way the 
effects of the other covariates have been to some extent controll ed for. 
We view the results below. Figure 1 shows the LOWESS plot for "predicted log earnings" by 
"years of education", for all individuals in each dataset. The slope of the plots reflects how 
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Years of Education 
The vertical axis is the log of predicted earn ings, controlling for age, age2, gender, race, years of education (including 
squared and cubic), age-education interactions, and regionaJ fIXed effects. The predicted values were generated using 
the Tobit estimator, to control for sample selection bias introduced through conditioning on whether an individual was 
employed or not, and therefore whether she reported earnings or not. The full sample including the zero earners is 
shown in Table 5 above. The pictures are generated through applying non-parametric Locally Weighted Scatter Plot 
Smoothing to the underlying fitted regression values against years of reported education, a method that is robust to 
outliers. 
If we look firstly at the predicted wage for all respondents for each dataset we clearly see the 
convex relationship between education and earnings. The predicted wage actually declines, 
although only slightly, up until approximately 7 years for the PSLSD, 1993 and OHS, 1995 and 
until 10 years of education for OHS, 1997 and LFS, 2000. All years under consideration rise 
sharply from II or 12 years25. It is important to note how flat the slope is until the II year mark, 
indicating the very small contribution of additional education to the predicted wage for all of 
primary and secondary schooling up to matric. The flatness of the slope is equivalent to the low, 
close to zero, returns that are generally reported for primary education. We see from these 
diagrams that these low returns actually appear to extend all the way through to having completed 











Hertz (200 I :54) finds the downward sloping graphs a robust feature of his regressions that are run 
for African males in the PSLSD, 1993 and have monthly earnings as the dependent variable. He 
offers two explanations for this result. First, he refers to potential importance of basic literacy 
(that is achieved at low levels of education) in helping to find employment. Second, he argues 
that beyond the basic literacy level of schooling there is likely to be a dominant labour market 
experience effect. This could occur if the majority of people with lower education are older. The 
apparent higher return to primary education may then be a function of age or labour market 
experience, rather than education level. He fmds that on controlling explicitly for potential years 
of experience and thus capturing the trade off between experience and schooling, that the 
relationship between years of schooling and predicted earnings becomes positive. We perform 
the same test for our two datasets in which the downward-sloping effect is most severe. The 
graphs below show that for OHS, 1997 and LFS, 2000 on controlling for potential experience, the 
downward sloping portion becomes positive. 
Figure 2: Predicted earnings and education controUing for potential experience 
OHS, 1997 - Controlling for experience LFS, 2000 - Controlling for experience 
8. 
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Notes: 
The vertical axis is the log of predicted earnings, controlling for age, age2, gender, race, years of education (including squared and 
cubic), age-education interactions, and regional fIxed effects. The predicted values were generated using the Tobit estimator, to 
control for sample selection bias introduced through conditioning on whether an individual was employed or not, and therefore 
whether she reported earnings or not. The pictures are generated through applying non-parametric Locally Weighted Scatter Plot 
Smoothing to the underlying fitted regression values against years of reported education, a method that is robust to outliers. In 
controUing for potential experience, the LOWESS plot is generated for those individuals with the indicated years of potential 
experience only. Potential experience is calculated as " age"-" years of education"- 6 according to Mincer's (1974) method. 
25 It can be seen that predicted earnings vary quite considerably across datasets. This too cautions on 
drawing conclusions on the size of returns from such econometric analyses. The convex pattern, however, 











Hertz (200 1) also examines the distribution of education misreporting and finds most errors occur 
when schooling is reported at three years or less. He therefore attributes the negative relation at 
low levels to data errors as opposed to labour market experience effects which he says are 
nonsensical as an explanation for young labour market participants that have not yet had time to 
forego accumulation of years of experience. 
It is also important to notice that after the turning point, the graphs are in general rather straight 
and particularly steep. It appears that the returns are constant up until approximately 11 years, 
increase substantially around this point, and thereafter are fairly constant but at a much higher 
level. The LOWESS plots then reveal that returns do not appear to increase continuously as 
implied by the results of the parametric regression analysis. The pattern of returns may rather be 
described as "lumpy" or discontinuous. For example. the diagrams show that one could invest for 
10 years, with practically zero return, or invest for more than 13 years and receive a high return. 
Such a pattern might more accurately be defined as a non-convex. This is precisely the type of 
situation modelled by Bardhan & Udry (1999) and Galor & Zeira (1993) discussed in Section 2. 
The implication of the non-convexity was the possible long run persistence of inequality. 
We now consider race effects more closely. Figure 3 shows the LOWESS plot for "predicted log 
earnings" by "years of education" and by race group. Constructing separate graphs for each race 
group in this manner is equivalent to running a parametric regression that includes race-education 
interaction terms. Viewing the relationships in this ,yay allows for analysis of both the within 
and between race effects. We can examine the between race effects because the underlying 











Figure 3: The relationsbip between education and predicted earnings including race effects 
PSLSD,1993 OHS, 1995 
10 
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Notes: 
The vertical axis is the log of predicted earnings, controUing for age, age2, gender, race, years of education (including squared and 
cubic), age-education interactions, and regional fixed effects, The predicted values were generated using the Tobit estimator, to 
control for sample selection bias introduced through conditioning on whether an individual was employed or not, and therefore 
whether she reported earnings or not. The full sample including the zero earners is shown in Table 7 above. The pictures are 
generated through applying non-parametric Locally Weighted Scatter Plot Smoothing to the underlying fitted regression values against 
years of reported education, a method that is robust to outliers. The pictures indicate both with-in group and between group 
heterogeneity in the returns to education which is represented by both the curvature of the lines and the distance between them, 
respectively. 
For both whites and Asians, there are so few observations for educational attainment of up to 











from around 8 years26. For 1995, 1997 and 2000 we see that for whites the predicted wage 
increases with each additional year of education with a sl ight kink around the 12 year mark. The 
PSLSD, 1993 has the predicted wage increases starting at a later stage but also show the kink at 
matric. This kink may reflect short term frictional unemployment for school leavers searching for 
their first job. It is interesting that even from 8 years of education, the graphs for Africans and 
coloureds seem to exhibit a similar shape but those for Whites are quite different, at least until the 
turning points for the other races. The reason for this must be attributed to the low number of 
whites that are unemployed, thereby not pulling the return to education for this group to zero. For 
1993, 1995 and 2000, the graphs for African and coloureds are practically parallel. This would 
infer that the processes affecting the returns to these two races are indeed very similar. The 
difference arises in that coloureds earn a significant premium. The slopes of the graphs for 
tertiary education appear in general to be steeper for Asians and whites, indicating higher returns 
to tertiary education for these two groups. Although the pattern fluctuates somewhat across 
years, there in fact appears to be convergence between the returns to education for these two 
races, at least for levels of tertiary education. 
The relationships that are revealed in the above figures highlight the value of using the semi-
parametric approach. In this way both the levels of predicted wages for the different races can be 
compared, as well as the returns that are based on the common group mean. 
Our analysis of the plots serves to deepen our understanding of the relationship between 
education and earnings. We have corroborative evidence of the low returns to primary education 
indicated by the zero slope of the graph for years up to 7. We see this trend persist until around 
the 10 year mark. After the turning point it then appears that there is a much higher return to 
tertiary levels of schooling, but that this in itself is fairly constant. These findings differ 
somewhat from the parametric result that indicates returns increasing strongly from 8 or 9 years. 
The semi-parametrics have revealed an important turning point. The pattern of returns to 
different levels of education is found once again, to be increasing even if not as sharply for years 
post 13 . We have also been able to consider the returns by race. The returns are found to be 
increasing within each race group. Between races it appears that it is whites and Asians who 
receive the greatest returns to tertiary education. 
26 The graph for whites for SALDRU93 is interesting in that there are a fair number of observations for 











Once again the convexity of returns imply the possibility of poverty traps and persistent within 
group inequality. This result has been considered by both Lam (1999) and Hertz (200 I) who 
assert that within-group increasing returns can be expected to lead to increased within-race 
inequality. Hertz comments further that between-race inequality is likely to decrease. In the 
sense that the distributions within race may become more similar even though more unequal, this 
view might hold. Indeed, Moll (2000) finds a decrease in between-race earnings inequality from 
1980 to 1993 but an increase in within-race inequality. The change in the pattern of inequality is 
attributed to an increase in occupational mobility and the average educational attainment of 
Africans as well as a decline in discrimination. The link between the change in average 
educational attainment and the pattern of returns to education should, however, not be ignored. 
Moll (2000) also states that from his study one cannot predict how inequality will change in the 
future. It is here that the findings of our semi-parametric analysis become particularly 
informative. The patterns we find by race suggest that coloureds and Africans receive lower 
returns to higher education. This would in fact suggest widening inequality between the race 
groups. Once discrimination is largely removed, ceterus paribus, it would be unsurprising to see 
persistent or even increasing inequality between whites and Asians as a group and Africans and 
coloureds as another group. This result cautions at discounting the importance of race as an 
explanatory variable due to apparent declines in between race inequality. The quality of schools 
and tertiary institutions, as well as occupational streaming, is still quite specific to the various 
races and the effects working through the return to education could have an impact on inequality 
for a long time to come. 
6. Conclusion 
The main objective of this paper was to ascertain with confidence, the pattern of returns to 
education in South Africa. Once this is established, the implications for inequality can be more 
clearly understood. Through thorough analysis of past studies and empirical modelling using 
both parametric and semi-parametric techniques, we conclude that the relationship between 
education and earnings in South Africa is convex with returns to schooling increasing with the 
level of education attained. The discontinuity found in the leap of returns from primary to higher 











appears on a more rudimentary note that the returns to higher education for Africans and 
coloureds are lower than the returns for Asians and whites. 
It seems likely that this pattern of increasing returns is driven by three main factors that can be 
explained in terms of the supply of low skilled workers, the demand for highly skilled workers 
and the large quantity of surplus labour in the economy. The vast supply of workers with low 
skills has resulted in earnings for this group being particularly meagre. This serves to drive down 
the returns to primary education. On the other end of the education spectrum, the limited supply 
of highly skilled workers and therefore excess demand has resulted in a particularly high skills 
premium. This pushes up the returns to tertiary education. Lastly, including the unemployed in 
the analysis serves to lower returns at the levels of education for which the highest proportions of 
the unemployed are found . The major portion of surplus labour in the economy is found amongst 
those who have relatively low levels of education, thus contributing to the pattern of increasing 
returns. 
The pattern of returns has implications for the incentives driving individuals' human capital 
investment decisions. Increasing returns suggest that if education was free for everyone, all 
people would strive to accumulate as much as possible, so as to take advantage of higher labour 
market rewards . If an individual is faced with borrowing constraints, however, he must make his 
investment decision in an imperfectly functioning market. As Hertz (2001) explains, if a person 
is financially constrained and knows he will not be able to afford higher education he might quite 
rationally decide to drop out of schooling at a very low level, as the returns received are minimal. 
The expected pattern of the distribution of education would then be bifurcated. Based on the 
assumption that education maps to income, the consequent distribution of wealth would also be 
expected to bifurcate and persist. This outcome suggests persistent inequal ity in which those with 
initial wealth can invest in human capital and reap high returns whereas those who are financially 
constrained and unable to borrow cannot invest, do not accumulate human capital and become 
caught in a poverty trap. Such a situation relates closely to the models of multiple equlibria and 
low intergenerational mobility constructed by Galor and Zeira (1993) and Bardhan and Udry 
(1999) described in Section 1. The South African story is reinforced along racial lines due to 
past, rather than current discrimination. 
In South Africa the minimum legal requirement for school attendance is that a child must go to 











in which he turns 15 or completes grade 9, whichever comes first (Department of Education 
(1996)). Our finding of increasing returns would then indicate that one might expect a large 
number of teenagers leaving school after acquiring 8 or 9 years of education or upon reaching 15. 
This in fact seems to be the case as across the surveys approximately 50% of labour market 
participants aged 30 or below have an educational attainment of 9 years or less indicating a fairly 
high drop out rate at these levels. With secondary education highly subsidised by the state and 
more freely available to all races now than in the apartheid era, we would also expect to see a 
mass of people attain 12 years. Approximately 30% of those below age 31 have secondary 
education (20% for PSLSD, 1993). 
The implications of the above create a fairly discouraging picture in terms of labour mobility and 
the persistence of inequality. The problem seems to be rooted in the exceptionally high 
unemployment rates for all levels of education below tertiary, as well as the prohibitive cost of 
tertiary education facing individuals with borrowing constraints. It appears that large 
interventions will be necessary to lift people out of poverty. Without good levels of economic 
growth and employment creation as well as greater access to funding for tertiary education either 
through borrowing or other means, it appears that the multiple equilibrium outcome and high 
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Appendix A: Estimates of Mincerian Returns to Schooling in South African Studies 
Coverage of Regression Dependent Education 
Stud~ earnings function !1'~e variable Controls terms 
Mwabu and Schultz Heckman and log gross hourly rural dummy, experience, African 
(2000) Wage earners OLS. wage experience' Splines Male African Female While Male White Female 
(PSLSD 1993) 16-65 Reported results Primary 0.084 • 0.062 • -0.012 -0.034 
Separate equations for OLS only as Secondary 0.158 • 0.249 • 0.084 • 0.052 • 
Source:Table 2 p214 for gender, race, little difference Tertiary 0.294 • 0.396 * 0.151 • 0.139 • 
location(not included n 9325 10473 1447 1517 
here) 
unemployed, race dummies, age, age2, no of Male employed Male Female Female 
Rospabe (200 I) Formal & informal multinomiallogit employed, self- kids, urban, married, family Splines self-employed employed self-employed 
(OHS 1999) 16-65 employed members' employment status, Primary -0.022 • 0.031 -0.031 • -0.052 • 
household head, distance from Secondary 0.039 • 0.032 0.086 • -0.05\ * 
phone, province Tertiary 0.446 * 0.422 * 0.764 * 0.636 * 
n 19920 18913 
interval regression log groass race, experien::e, experience', Splines Males Females 
(generalized tobit) hourly earnings tenure, tenure-, unIOn, Primary 0.027 * 0.030 * 
occupation, industrial sector, Secondary 0.091 • 0111 • 
province, urban, married, Tertiary 0.176 • 0.153 • 
formal sector n 9913 7651 
log monthly gender, province ,sector, union, White African semi-
Shorat (2000) Formal & informal OLS wage experience, experience', urban, Splines African skilled skilled skill White semi-skill 
(OHS, 1995) 16-64 log hours worked per month Primary 0.037 • 0.010 0.039 • -0.074 
Separate equations Secondary 0.122 • -0.004 0.128 • 0.137 • 
for race Tertiary 0.159 * 0.256 • 0.017 -0.031 
n 2663 2536 7396 3179 
Michaud and log gross hourly experience, experience2, wealth 
Vencatachellum Wage earners OLS wage proxy, skilled/semi-skilled Splines African malc African female 
(2001) dummy, manufacturing! Primary 0.046 • 0.013 
(PSLSD 1993) tertiary/ professional sector Secondary 0.116 • 0.073 • 
dummy, urban, province, union Tertiary 0.114 • 0.055 
dummy n 2361 1525 
Modified Stage l' experience, experience', wealth African male Africa male African female African female 
Heckman two step (Bivariate proxy, skilled/semi-skilled Splines non-un ionised unionized non-union ised unionized 
to estimate the probit model dummy, manufacruring! Primary 0.042 • -0007 0.013 -0.066 • 
wage equation with selection tertiaryl professional sector Secondary 0.114 • 0.055 • 0.052 • 0.092 • 
reported here to account for dummy, urban, province, union Tertiary 0.085 • 0.182 • 0035 0.136 * 
















Coverage of Regression 
Study _ earnings function type 
Bhorat & Leibbrandt Africans only Probit 
(200 I) 16-65 
(OHS, 1995) Marginal effects 






Service and Human 
Sciences Research 
Council Survey 
Formal & informal 
(exclud ing those 
identified as both) 
(doesn't state whether 
formal & 
infonmal) 








at the mean 


















age dummies, urban, 






age dummies, urban, province Splines 
urban, province, industrial 
sector, occupation, 
experience, experience', log 
hours worked per month 
White dummy, age, age' 
experience, experience l , 
married, region dummies 
Moll is the only author that 
assigns a dummy to 12 years 
of schooling as well as to a 
diploma or degree. The 
coefficient for higher 
education in this case is 
interpreted as additional to 





































































































African male African female 
0.004 • 0.003 
0.016 • 0.057 • 
0.016 * 0011 * 
15658 19548 
Narrow UE 
African male African female 
-0 .009 * -0009 • 
0000 -0.021 * 
0.036 • 0.153 • 
11931 9426 
Narrow UE 
African male African female 
0.036 * 0.051 • 
O. lOS • 0.093 • 











Coverage of Regression Dependent 
Stud), earnings function ty~c variable Controls Education terms 
African males multinomiallogit Inactive, urban, rural, single, not Fomlal non-
Hofmeyer (200 I) Formal & informal unemployed, household head age,age2, grant Dummies union Formal union 
(OHS 1999) coefficients to be informal sector, support, household size, have primary -0.418 • -0.131 
16 and over il)terpreted as odds unregulated formal young children std8 -0.509 • -0 .357 • 
ralios employment, formal malric 0.683 * 1.048 * 
(reporting results employment non- dip (no mat) 0.161 1.088 * 
for most relevant union member, dip (wiul mat) 0 .973 * 1.963 • 
sectors) formal employment degree 1.001 * 1.681 • 
union member' 
weighted least log gross hourly urban, rural, industrial sector, Formal non-
squares wage occupation, single, not Dummies union Formal union 
(wage equation) household head , experience, primary 0.175 • 0.140 • 
experience2, job duration, Uob std8 0 .326 • 0.247 • 
duration)2 matric 0.507 • 0.470 • 
dip (no mat) 0.486 • 0.623 • 
dip (with mat) 0.957 • 0.841 • 
degree 1.297 * 1.006 • 
n 3039 2720 
Hosking (200 I) Not stated OLS log earnings experience, experience2 African Coloured Indian White 
(1996 Population (gives no further Primary 0.38 * 0.52 • 0 .10* -0.43 • 
Census) detail) Secondary 1.58 * 1.79 * 1.01 • 0.56 * 
Tertiary 2.27 * 2.33 * 1.58 • 0 .98 * 
n 446938 88442 31083 154695 
All Races 
Primary 040' 
Secondary 1.95 • 
Tertiary 2.52 * 
n 727098 
Kingdon & Knight wage earners OLS log gross hourly experience, experience2, race, All races & 
(1999) wage gender, union, urban , province, genders 
(PSLSD 1993) 16-64 married, occupation, public Years of education 0.004 
(doesn ' t state seclor, tar road dummies, broad (Years of education)' 0.004 • 
whether formal & U' rale per residential cluster, ( n 6498 
informal) broad U· rate)', dissatisfaction, 
homeland 
Erichsen & Regular wage OLS log gross monully experience, experience2,rural, 1993 male 1995 male 1993 female 1995 female 
Wake ford (200 I) earning employees wage union, industrial sector, Years of education -0.004 -0.005 -0.01 0.026 • 
(OHS, 1995 , 16-64 occupation, province (Years of education)' 0.007 • 0.007 • 0.005 • 0.004 • 
PSLSD 1993) Excludes self- n 2223 11727 1570 6396 
employed 











Appendix B: Issues Concerning the Definition of Unemployment, 
Employment and Earnings 
The aim of the empirical analysis was to test the same earnings function specification across a 
number of datasets and thereby to verifY whether increasing returns are a robust feature of the 
data. Working with a number of datasets required a careful study of each survey's 
representativeness. It also required definitions of variables to be precise and consistent across 
datasets. In this Appendix we discuss our choice of definitions used and how we tested for the 
representativeness of the sample surveys. 
In the econometric exercise we wished to explore the total effect of education on individuals' 
economic outcomes. We therefore include the unemployed in the analysis in order to account of 
how education impacts on both the probability of finding employment and on ones earnings given 
one is employed. As the unemployed are included, it was necessary to define the economically 
active population and therefore choose whether to use the broad or narrow definitions of 
unemployment. A growing literature on the extent of 'discouraged workers' and the greater 
suitability of using the expanded definition when examining the jobless in a South African 
context infonned our choice here (see Kingdon and & Knight (1999), (2000); Nattrass (2000); 
Wittenberg( 1999); Dinkelman & Pirouz (2002)). 
Although we use a broad classification for the unemployed, we use a 'narrow' definition for the 
employed . Income earners are restricted to formal sector full time wage employees from age 15. 
The main reason for using this restricted group is that full time wage employment should 
represent the least variable component in earnings. Self-employed, part-time and casual workers 
will have highly variable earnings that will often be subject to a large degree of seasonality. 
Inclusion of these groups will diminish the reliability of the coefficients across surveys as the 
nature of these data are inherently noisy. Furthermore, there is not adequate income and 
expenditure information for the self-employed in the post 1995 OHSs and the LFS, 2000. In 
addition to the above, definitions of part-time, casual, seasonal and temporary work also differ 
across surveys. 
All individuals who were working in some form but did not fit our definition of employment are 
excluded from the sample of interest. The economically active population then includes all 











broad definition of unemployment thereby including discouraged workerseekers, that is, those 
who indicate they would like to work even if they are not actively seeking employment. 
Once the appropriate definitions of the relevant variables had been established, it was necessary 
to deal with two particular problems concerning the income variable. The first problem is that of 
missing values. Owing to the private nature of individual earnings, this variable reflected the 
highest level of non-response. Following Hertz (2001) these respondents are simply excluded 
from our estimates. 27 
The second problem arises in the Statistics South Africa surveys in which respondents were given 
the option of reporting their actual earnings or alternatively, earnings categories. Percentage-
wise, the number who reported their actual or point income in 1997, 1998 and 1999 is relatively 
low. It was therefore necessary to ascertain whether reporting of point as opposed to interval data 
was random. If this was the case, we could exclude those with interval data from our estimations . 
If, however, there was some systematic process at work that resulted in a bias in the distribution 
of point income reported as opposed to interval, one could not use only the point data as 
assumptions of log normality of the distributions would be violated. Moreover, ordinary least 
squares regressions cannot be run on midpoints of interval data as the data is count, not 
continuous. We explain and demonstrate below how we tested for randomness of reported point 
income in each of the OHS datasets. 
The samples of interest are all those classified as employed according to our definition, who have 
reported income, either as an actual amount or as fall ing into a specified earnings bracket. The 
first step was to create an income category variable that reflected the appropriate income interval 
for all individuals under consideration. Step two involved simulating point data for each earnings 
category assuming random sampling with replacement and a uniform distribution within the 
categories. The next step was to construct a density plot for the simulated point data so that we 
could visualize the income distribution of the entire sample. We then generated a new variable 
that reflected intervals for those cases where only point data was reported and repeat the 
simulation process on this variable. Finally density plots using midpoint data for the full set of 
income categories as well as for just those who reported point data were also constructed. The 
27 Using the PSLD 1993 Hertz(200 1) compares the distribution of education across those who have not 
reported an income with those who have reported an income and finds them extremely similar. This infers 
that the incidence of earnings non-reporting is independent of a respondent's schooling level. The random 










aim of constructing the various plots was to develop a representative distribution and then to 
compare this with the other various earnings distribution plots to ascertain if the point data we 
have appears random and can be used in estimation techniques to produce unbiased estimates. 
Figure 4 in which the histograms are kernel density estimates integrated to I, shows the results. 
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Notes: 
10 10 
Log of Monthty Wages, OHS 1999 (different samples) 
The figures are density plots of reported and simulated data used to test the randomness of reporting income either as an 











We start by comparing the density plots for those who reported point income, with the simulated 
data from constructed income categories for this exact group of respondents, to examine how well 
our simulation rule replicates the true distribution. We see that for 1995 and 1997 the density of 
the actual point data exceeds that of the simulated point data indicating slightly more variation in 
the log of wages for the simulated case. The reverse is true, however, for 1998 and 1999 with the 
reported data having the flatter distribution. These simulated plots, however, lie fairly closely to 
the reported data plots indicating a reasonably representative simulation. 
Across surveys, the density plot that diverges most from the plot of actual reported data is the 
graph constructed from interval midpoints for all individuals. This is most apparent for the 1995 
OHS where we see the midpoint line is rather arbitrary and has quite obviously over-sampled 
wealthier individuals in its assigning observations to the middle of each relevant category. The 
reason the OHS, 1995 result is so pronounced is rooted in the questionnaire design for this year. 
The choice of income categories in 1995 differs from the other years in that the lowest category 
was a rather large R1-R999 (per week, month or year) whereas in subsequent years this income 
range was broken down into 3 smaller categories which allows for better approximation of the 
actual data, especially in a country such as South Africa where such a large proportion of the 
population are low earners. It can be seen quite clearly from our graphs that using midpoint data 
,vill not yield unbiased results. 
Finally we compare the density plot derived from simulated point data across the income intervals 
covering all reported earnings with the plot for which only point data is reported. We see for 
1995, 1998 and 1999 that the plot for point data lies slightly to the left of that for the entire 
sample. This would seem to indicate that there is slightly lower response of actual income 
information for those in the higher income brackets. We can also see that for 1995, 1997 and 
1999 the wage dispersion is not as great for the reported data as it is for the entire simulated 
sample and that in the reported point data we appear to have undersampling of the poor and 
oversampling of the middle classes. 
The differences for 1995, 1997 and 1998 however, appear small and we are therefore satisfied 
that for the purposes of our investigation that the point data is (surprisingly) representative of the 
entire sample. From this evidence we then decide to reduce our samples in the OHS surveys to 











sample "unemployment rate" above the actual unemployment rate for each year. The 
randomness of the point income reported, however, should mean that no large bias is introduced. 
OHS, 1999 reveals the most severe difference between the reported point and interval income 
data and seemingly the highest probability that estimates based on this data will be biased. This 
is a key reason for excluding the survey and results from our analysis here. We also then exclude 
OHS, 1998 partially as it too has a large percentage of non-response but more importantly as 












Appendix C: Issues concerning censoring bias 
Simple Mincerian returns to education are generally calculated using ordinary least squares 
regressions run for all those with positive earnings in the relevant sample. This, however, can be 
problematic. Random samples of a popUlation of interest are likely to include both earners and 
non-earners. Excluding non-earners from the regression means that the sample is no longer 
randomly selected and OLS results will not be truly representative of the population. (Breen 
(1996: 2)) Furthermore, the results will be biased for statistical reasons that are elaborated on 
below. Essentially we have a sample selection problem in that we have the right hand side 
variables for all individuals sampled, but either a zero for those who are unemployed or positive 
income for those who are employed. That is, one can only earn an income, given one is 
employed. Our dependent variable is therefore truncated from below at zero. 
In a standard OLS regression oftlle form 
( 1 ) 
the estimates of fl are the BLUE if the assumptions of E(I.1) 0 and E( J.1/J.1tJ 0 if i ::;1f;J hold or 
equivalently if J.1, - IN(O, eI). If either of these assumptions is violated, then estimates of flwill be 
biased. 
When using OLS as an estimation technique, one has the choice of running the regression on the 
sub-sample of the employed only or of running it on the full sample (that is, including both the 
employed and the unemployed). 
If the first option is chosen and only those who report positive earnings are included (thereby 
creating a truncated sample) y, is observed only if y, O. Specifically, 
y, = x;fl + 11, only if YI > 0 (1 a) 
Estimating such a model requires one to take conditional expectations according to the formula 
for the expected value of a random variable Yi conditional on x, and censored at c (in this case 
c=O). The formula is shown in equation 2 bclo\\'. 
E( V I x ) = I)r( V > 0 I x )E( V I}' > 0, x ) 











Now YI > 0 implies that 
fi!X + U > a or II. > -fi!X I I I r, I (3) 
so to estimate the first part of the equation 2, or pr(y, > a XI)' we must find 
pr(ul > -xi'fJj pr(ui < xi'fJj (4) 
The solution is to find the probability of the random variable P, that is assumed normally 
distributed with mean zero {E(p,) O}and constant variance ,d, The answer can then found 
by applying the formula for the cumulative standard normal distribution function gIven in 
equation 5 below. 
(5) 
To estimate the second part of the equation we need to find E(YI I YI > O,x,): 
Now 
(6) 
To estimate such an equation using normal OLS, it is required that 
E(u, If" > -X, 'fJ)=O (7) 
However, it is already assumed that the unconditional expected value of p, is zero {E( p,) O} so 
clearly the conditional expected value of p, {E(p, I PI> - j3xJ} cannot also equal zero, It is 
apparent that in this case two assumptions for unbiased OLS estimate of f3 are violated, namely 












Developing the model more fully shows why running OLS on all the observations will also yield 
biased results: 
To get an unbiased estimate of E(fJl I fJi > -x, 'j3j, it is necessary to use the statistical result that 
gives the expected value of a truncated normally distributed random variable as shown below. 
(-x;fJ)' 
(8) 
where ¢, is the standard normal density function evaluated at x, 'j3/er 
The solution to equation 7 then includes the evaluation of the standard normal distribution 
function and the standard normal density function at x, 'fl/er 
E(u i lu,> -x;[J) = (J' : 
I 
(9) 
Now to estimate the complete model 
equations 5 and 9 are combined to get 
(10) 
From equation 10 it can be seen why running OLS on all observations will also lead to biased 
results. This is because in order to get an unbiased estimate of fJ it is necessary that (/J, 1 and 
therefore,e that ¢I 0 (ie none ofthe observations in the sample be censored). But, the sample is 











Appendix D: Further Estimates 
Table 10: !\larginal Effects for OLS and Tobit Estimators (at the mean) for Specifications 2 to 9 

















































































































































































































































































































































































EducatIOn in years 
(Education In years)' 
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OLS93 Tobit93 OLS95 Toblt95 OLS97 Tobit97 OL500 TobitOO 
Specification 9 
Constant OA84 -3.635 • -0085 -3.460 • 0.525 • -3.557 * -0 744 • -5.843 " 
(0301) (0.370) (0 165) (0211 ) (0189) (0227) (0 171) (021 i) 
Age 0.253 • 0.316 • 0.256 • 0.323 • 0.207 • 0.270 * 0256 * 0.357 • 
(0015) (0.019) (0008) (0 010) (0009) (DOli) (0008) (DOlO) 
Age Squared -0.002 * -0003 * -0002 * -0.003 • -() 002 * -0003 • -0002 • -0003 • 
(0.000) (0.000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (DODO) (DODO) 
Female -0.641 * -0690 • -l.389 • -1.748" -0.858 * -0.947 " -0.700 • -0.786 • 
(0.060) (0.072) (0.031 ) (0.040) (0.031) (0.037) (0.032) (0038) 
African -3.868 • -3.456 • -3.015 " -3077 • -2.987 • -2.684 * -3106 • -2.695 * 
(0 106) (0119) (0.053) (0064) (0080) (0087) (0.071 ) (0.076) 
Coloured -2A57 • -1.922 • -1.725 * -1.501 • -1.294 • -0.813 ' -1550 • -0.975 • 
(0135) (0.150) (0064) (0.076) (0088) (0095) (0.082) (0088) 
Asian -1.635' -1.268 • -0.777 • -0.654 * -1051 * -0750 • -0.979 • -0.682 * 
(0 182) (0.199) (0092) (0.109) (0 137) (0149) (0126) (0 134) 
Education in years 0088 * 0075 • 0.119 * 0.120 • 0.046 * 0028 * 0062 * 0.046 * 
(0008) (0.010) (0.004) (0006) (0004) (0.005) (0005) (0.005) 
Union 3A42 • 3.144 * 3.132 * 3211 * 4.217* 3605 * 4A26 * 3.611 * 
1008S) (0097) (004 I) (0048) (0043) (0048 ) (0044 ) (0049) 
sIgma 2.717 2733 2.727 2,721 











Table 11: Tobit Index Values for Specifications 1 to 10 
Tobit Index 93 Tobit Index 95 Tobit Index 97 Tobit Index 00 
Specification 1 
Constant -14.990' -11.804 ' -15.909 • -22 829 * 
(0685) (03) 4) (0460) (0458) 
Age 0.716 • 0.579 * 0.690 * 0.999 • 
(0037) (0.016) (0.024) (0023) 
Age squared -0.007 • -0.005 * -0.006 • -0.009 • 
(0000) (0.000) (0000) (0.000) 
Education In years -0.472 * -0.306 * -0.337 * -0.375 • 
(0.056) (0026) (0033 ) (0037) 
Sigma 0.065 * 0.048 • 0.046 • 0.049 • 
(0004) (0.002) (OOO2) (0002) 
Log Likelihood -16241.36 -67671.51 -58086.88 -54501.75 
n 8487 31777 30956 29949 
Specification 2 
Constant -17.155 • -13568 * -17.344' -25104' 
(0698) (0314) (0460) (0453 ) 
Age 0.716 * 0.579 * 0.691 • 1008 * 
(003S) (0016) (0024 ) (0.023) 
Age squared -0.007 * -0005 * -0006 * -0.009 • 
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) 
Education in years 0409 * 0.375 * 0.287 • 0.354 * 
(0018) (0008) (0010) (0011 ) 
Sigma 5.823 * 5064 • 6.271 • 6.326 * 
(0.073 ) (0029 ) (0.043) (0044) 
Log Likelihood -1635261 -68045.15 -58284.30 -5471222 
Scpcification 3 
Constant -15.250' -11.914 • -15.953* -22.883 • 
(0688) (0.313 ) (0459) (0456) 
Age 0.719 * 0572 * 0.679 • 0.980 * 
(0037) (0.016) (0.024) (0022) 
Age squa~ed -0.007 * -0.005 * -0.006 * -0.009 • 
(0000) (0000) (0000) (oor)O) 
Education in vears -0.112 0092 • 0.239 * 0283 • 
(0.124) (0.055) (007! ) (0075) 
(EducatJon in -0.006 -0.027 * -0066 * -0068 * 
(0.022) (0.009) (0012) (0012) 
(Education in years)' 0.003 * 0.004 * 0.005 * 0005 * 
(0001) (0000) (0001 ) (OOO! i 
sigma 5.681 * 4.974 • 6.195 * 6234 * 













Tobit Index 93 Tobit Index 95 Tobit Index 97 Tobit Index 00 
Sepcification 4 
Constant - 12.357 * -8 873 • -9.953 • -15.384 * 
(0627) (0.290) (DADO) (0.394 ) 
Age 0.566 • OA21' OA06 • 0.637 • 
(0.034 ) (0.015) (002 I) (0.0 I 9) 
Age squared -0006 • -0.004 * -0004 • -0006 * 
(OOOO) (0000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education m years -0126 0.10] •• 0.120 •• 0.148*' 
(0.113) CO.OS] ) (0062) (0066) 
(Education in years)2 -0018 -0041 * -0054 * -0052 • 
(0020) (0009) CO.OIl) (0010) 
(Education In years)3 0.004 • 0.004 • 0004 • 0004 • 
(0.00 I) (0000) (000]) (0000) 
Union 5.809 • 4.5]8 * 6.900 * 6807 • 
(0169) (0.069) (0090) (0091 ) 
sigma 5152 • 4.573 ' 5377 '" 5.399 • 
(0064) (0.026) (0037) (0038) 
Log Likelihood -15630.18 -65577.12 -55142.0 I -51741.25 
Sepcification 5 
Constant -11.864 • -7.719' -9.294 * -14.805* 
(0.624 ) (0281 ) (0394) (0390) 
Age 0.573 * 0.422 ~ 0.426 ' 0650 • 
(0033 ) (0014) (0021 ) (0019) 
Age Squared -0006 ' -0004 • -0.004 • -0.006 • 
(0.000) (0.000) (0000) (0000) 
Female -I 162 -2455 • -1.863 • -1571 * 
(0126) (0.055) (0069) (0072) 
Education In years -0.162 0017 0087 0.128** 
(0 112) (0050) (0061 ) (0065) 
(Education In years)' -0.010 -0.023 • -0046 * -0048 * 
(0020) (0008) (OO! I) (0010) 
(Education In 0.004 * 0.003 * 0.004 * 0.004 • 
(000l) (0.000) (000 I) (0.000) 
Union 5.618 * 4.145 * 6.545 * 6.490 * 
(0 168) (0067) (0.089) (0091 ) 
sIgma 5.113 * 4.411 * 5.287 * 5337 • 













Tobit Index 93 Tobit Index 95 Tobit Index 97 Tobit Index 00 
Sepcification 6 
Constal1l -5.915 • -4.008 • -6.123 * -10044 • 
(0.620) (0281) (0409) (0400) 
Age 0.530 * 0425 • 0.478 * 0.644 * 
(0.031 ) (0.014) (0020) (0.019) 
Age Squared -0.005 * -0004 * -0005 • -0.006 • 
(0.000) (0000) (0000) (0000) 
Female -1.131 • -2.314 * -1695 • -1463 * 
(0 119) (0053) (0066) (0069) 
African -5.017* -3.686 • -4.325 * -4558 • 
(0205) (0.08S) (0156) (0 J 40) 
Coloured -2.350 • -1.483 * -0.902 * -1.360 * 
(0257) (0.103) (0 172) (0 J62) 
ASian -1.733 * -0.609 * -\000 * -I 045" 
(0329) (0144) (0264 ) (0.244) 
EducalJon In years -0086 0.068 0.024 0.069 
(0105) (0.047) (0.058) (0062) 
(Education in -0.018 -0.038 • -0.039 • -004 J • 
(0019) (0008) (0.010) (0.0 I 0) 
(Education in years)) 0.003 * 0.003 • 0.003 • 0003 • 
(0.001 ) (0000) (0.000) (0000) 
Limon 5216' 4242 • 6313 * 6.479 * 
(0 160) (0.064) (0085) (0087) 
Sigma 4.786 • 4.176 • 5.039 • 5.072' 
(0.060) (0024) (0034 ) (0 (35) 












Tobit Index 93 Tobit Index 95 Tobit Index 97 Tobit Index 00 
Sepcification 7 
Constant -4424 '" -4594 '" -5.561 • -10.224 * 
(0859) (0567 ) (0659) 
Age 0.477 '" 0438 * 0.448 • 0.642 * 
(0037) (0017) (0.024) (0024 ) 
Age Squared -0.005 * -0.004 • -0004 ... -0.006 ... 
(0.000) (0.000) (0000) (0000) 
Female -1.137 * -2.322 • -1.691 * -1461 • 
(0119) (0053 ) (0066) (0069) 
African -4.981 • -3.671 ... -4 199· -4.530 • 
(0207) (0.086) (0 157) (0 141) 
Coloured -2320 ... -1.465 • -0.778 • -1333 * 
(0.259) (0103) (0 173) (0163 ) 
Asian -1756 * -0612 * -0888 * -1.05-411< 
(OJ31 ) (0.144) (0.265) (0.245) 
Education in years -0.104 1.228 • 1.133 • 0.812 ... 
(0.351) (0 166) (0218) (0.238) 
(Education in -0083 -0.279 • -0.276 ... -0 195 ... 
(0064) (0028) (0038) (0.037) 
(Education In 0.008 • 0.016 ... 0015 ... 0011 ... 
(0003) (0001 ) (0002) (0002) 
Age' EducatlOn -0.001 -0.031 ... -0031 ... -0.019 • 
(0009) (0004) (0006) (0006) 
Age' EducatlOn' 0.002 0.006 • 0.007 • 0.004 • 
(0002) (0001) (0.001) (0001) 
Age' Educatlon' 0000 •• * 0.000 ... 0.000 ... 0000 '" 
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) 
Unton 5196 • 4.224 ... 6273 '" 6474 ... 
(0.160) (0.064) (0085) (0087) 
slgma 4.782 * 4.169 • 5.031 • 5.;)70 * 
(0060) (0.024) (0034) (0.035) 
Log LIkelIhood -15217.66 -63246.37 -53684.10 -50483.62 
Sepcification 8 -13.764 • -9296 * -10199* -16.315 * 
Constant (0636) (0.282) (0393) (0386) 
0.571' 0.428 • 0.·130 • 0664 • 
Age (0.034) (00 IS) (0.021) (0020) 
-0.006 • -0.004 • -0.004 • -0.006 • 
Age Squared (DODO) (0.000) (0000) (0000) 
-1.213 • -2.483 * -1865 • -1547 * 
Female (0130) (0.057) (0.070) (0073) 
0.335 • 0.315 * 0.126 • o 191 * 
EducatlOn in years (0017) (0007) (0009) (00 I 0) 
5.617 * 4.178 • 6.684 • 6656 • 
Union (0.173) (0069) (0090) (0092) 
5.271 • 4.504 * 5J34 * 5397 • 
slgma (0.066) (0026) (0.036) (0038) 












Constant -6.043 * -4.609 • -6.350 * -10703 * 
(0.626) (0284) (OAII) (0.400) 
Age 0.525 • 0.431 • OA82 • 0.654 * 
(0032) (0014) (0020) (0019) 
Age Squared -0005 * -0004 * -0.005 • 006 • 
(DO~O) (0000) (0000) (0.000) 
Female -Ll48 * -2.328 * -1.690 * -I 439 * 
(0120) (0053) (0.067) (0.070) 
African -5.745 * -4098 * -4.793 • -4 937 • 
(0 198) (0085) (0155) (0139) 
Coloured -3.195 • -2.000 • -1.451 • -1.786 • 
(0249) (0102) (0 170) (0161 ) 
Asian -2.109 • -0.871 • -1.340 • -I 249 * 
(0.331 ) (0.145) (0265) (0246) 
Education In vears 0.125 * 0.160 • 0.050 * 0084 * 
(0.017) (0007) (0.009) (0.010) 
Cnion 5.227 * 4.278 • 5437 • 6.615 • 
(0161) (0.065) (0.085) (0087) 
sIgma 4.841 * 4234 • 5074 • 5.110 • 












Tobit Index 93 Tobit Index 95 Tobit Index 97 Tobit Index 00 
Sepcification 10 
Constant -4.828 * -40 I;] * -544 I * -9.466 ~ 
(0847) (0426) (0567) (0.662) 
Age 0453 * 0433 * 0424' 0619 * 
(0.036) (0017) (0.023) (0.024) 
Age Squared -0005 • -0.004 • -0004 • -0006 * 
(0000) (0.000) (0000) (0000) 
Female -0.952 • -2.266 * -1.63 I * -1384 • 
(0116) (0.052) (0.065) (0069) 
African -468 I • -3.396 * -3.591 * -4093 ¥ 
(0208) (0087) (0 158) (0143) 
Coloured -2.709 • -1.425 • -U96 x -1.912 • 
(0285) (0 108) (0.184) (0.176 ) 
Asian -0.889 • -0.573 * 0.335 -0.667 * 
(0.348) (0 147) (0269) (0252) 
EducallOn in years -0.108 1227 * 1057 • 0.806 * 
(0342) {O 165} (0215) (0236) 
(Education in -0082 -0284 * -0267 * -0.195 * 
(0062) (0028) (0038) (0037) 
(Education in 0.008 * 0.016 * 0.014 * 0.011 * 
(OOO}) (0.001 ) (0002) (0.002) 
Age' Education 0001 -0.031 * -0030 • -0020 • 
(0009) (0004) (0005) (0006) 
Age' Education' 0.002 0.007 * 0.007 * 0.004 * 
(0.002) (0001) (0001 ) (0001 ) 
Age· Education' 0000 *. 0000 * 0.000 * 0000 * 
(0.000) (0.000) (0000) (0000) 
Union 4794 • 4.147 • 6.1 J 0 * 6469 * 
(0 155) (0063) (0083) (0087) 
Western Cape 1.866 • 0.025 1.676 0.718 * 
(0259) (0109) (0147) (O! 51) 
Eastern Cape -0.922 * -1.691 • -1.812 • -2.036 • 
(0235) (0095) (0 135) (0134) 
Northern Cape 0.079 -0790 * 0.922 * -0.151 
(0503 ) (0.147) (0 177) (0180) 
Free State -3.100 • -0.114 1.038 -0.532 * 
(OA17) (0103) (0.129) (0.138) 
KwaZulu-Natal -0.094 MO.5:!3 * -1.194 • -0.826 • 
(0208) (0.090) (0118) (0 118) 
Northwest Province 2.034 * -0 341 * 0.117 -0.774 • 
(0223) (0 110) (0127) (0.128) 
Mpumuianga 2.270 * -0.536 * 0.752 • -1.090 * 
(0224) (0 106) (0.132) (0143) 
Northern Province 0.191 -1.420 • -0.112 -1.128 • 
(0237) (0.118) (0137) (0.140) 
Sigma 4.625 • 4.128 • 4.942 * 5.017 * 
(0058) (0024) (0033) (0035) 
Likelihood 
75 
Un
ive
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ty 
of 
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